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Summary Table 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure -0.3 2.0 3.5 3.8 3.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 1.4 4.6 -0.8 1.0 1.0 
Investment -6.6 14.3 28.2 22.5 22.1 
Exports 2.5 12.1 13.8 9.3 6.7 
Imports 0.0 14.7 16.3 12.5 10.7 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1.4 5.2 7.8 4.8 4.1 
Gross National Product (GNP) 4.6 6.9 5.7 5.0 4.3 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
    
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 0.5 0.2 -0.3 1.0 1.0 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings -0.8 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.3 
      
       
Labour Market      
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000’s)) 1,881 1,914 1,964 2,002 2,038 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000’s)) 282 243 204 190 171 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 13.1 11.3 9.5 8.7 7.7 
      
       
Public Finance      
General Government Balance (€ bn) -10.2 -7.6 -3.4 -2.5 -0.5 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -5.8 -4.1 -1.6 -1.1 -0.2 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 123.2 109.7 93.9 87.4 82.0 
      
       
External Trade      
Balance of Payments Current Account (€ bn) 5.6 6.8 9.5 8.8 1.8 
Current Account (% of GNP) 3.1 3.6 4.4 3.8 0.7 
      
      
Demand      
Final Demand 0.9 9.4 11.9 8.7 7.6 
Domestic Demand -1.2 5.7 9.3 7.7 9.0 
Domestic Demand (excl. Stocks) -1.5 5.2 8.6 8.6 9.1 
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National Accounts 2015 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 89.0 92.4 3.8 0.4 3.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27.2 27.9 2.3 3.1 -0.8 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 36.5 47.2 29.4 0.9 28.2 
Exports of Goods and Services 215.0 260.6 21.2 6.5 13.8 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.9 2.7 
   Final Demand 369.6 430.7 16.6 4.1 11.9
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services 180.3 215.7 19.6 2.9 16.3 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 -0.2    
GDP at Market Prices 189.3 215.0 13.6 5.5 7.7 
Net Factor Payments -26.2 -31.7    
GNP at Market Prices 162.9 183.1 12.4 6.4 5.7 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.4 3.4 0.0 1.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 70.0 73.4 3.3 4.8 
Other 68.4 88.8 20.4 29.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3 
  Statistical Discrepancy 0.2 0.2 
  Net Domestic Product 141.9 165.6 23.7 16.7
Net Factor Payments -26.2 -31.7 -5.5 21.0 
National Income 115.7 133.9 18.3 15.8 
Depreciation 29.3 30.0 0.7 2.3 
GNP at Factor Cost 145.0 163.9 18.9 13.1 
Taxes less Subsidies 17.9 19.2 1.3 7.4 
GNP at Market Prices 162.9 183.1 20.3 12.4 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 34.8 44.9 10.1 
F -26.2 -31.7 -5.5 
Net Transfers -2.7 -2.9 -0.1 
Balance on Current Account 5.9 10.4 4.5 
as % of GNP 3.6 5.7 2.4 
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National Accounts 2016 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 92.4 96.9 4.8 1.0 3.8 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27.9 28.6 2.8 1.8 1.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 47.2 59.5 25.9 2.8 22.5 
Exports of Goods and Services 260.6 293.2 12.5 3.0 9.3 
Physical Changes in Stocks 2.7 1.0 
   Final Demand 430.7 479.2 11.2 2.4 8.7
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services  215.7 249.4 15.6 2.8 12.5 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 -0.2    
GDP at Market Prices 215.0 229.8 6.9 2.0 4.7 
Net Factor Payments  -31.7 -33.0    
GNP at Market Prices 183.1 196.5 7.3 2.2 5.0 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.4 3.5 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 73.4 76.7 3.3 4.5 
Other 88.8 98.8 10.0 11.3 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3 
  Statistical Discrepancy 0.2 0.2 
  Net Domestic Product 165.6 179.0 13.4 8.1
Net Factor Payments -31.7 -33.0 -1.3 4.2 
National Income 133.9 146.0 12.0 9.0 
Depreciation 30.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 163.9 176.0 12.0 7.3 
Taxes less Subsidies 19.2 20.6 1.4 7.1 
GNP at Market Prices 183.1 196.5 13.4 7.3 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 44.9 43.8 -1.1 
F -31.7 -33.0 -1.3 
Net Transfers -2.9 -2.9 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 10.4 8.0 -2.4 
as % of GNP 5.7 4.1 -1.2 
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National Accounts 2017 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 96.9 101.2 4.5 1.0 3.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 28.6 28.8 0.4 -0.6 1.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 59.5 74.6 25.4 2.8 22.1 
Exports of Goods and Services 293.2 319.9 9.1 2.3 6.7 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.0 2.0 
   Final Demand 479.2 526.5 9.9 2.1 7.6
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services  249.4 281.9 13.0 2.1 10.7 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.2 -0.2    
GDP at Market Prices 229.8 244.7 6.5 2.2 4.2 
Net Factor Payments  -33.0 -34.2    
GNP at Market Prices 196.5 210.2 7.0 2.6 4.3 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.5 3.6 0.1 3.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 76.7 79.9 3.2 4.2 
Other 98.8 108.8 10.0 10.1 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.3 -0.3 
  Statistical Discrepancy 0.2 0.2 
  Net Domestic Product 179.0 192.4 13.4 7.5
Net Factor Payments -33.0 -34.2 -1.2 3.6 
National Income 146.0 158.2 12.2 8.3 
Depreciation 30.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 176.0 188.2 12.2 6.9 
Taxes less Subsidies 20.6 22.1 1.5 7.4 
GNP at Market Prices 196.5 210.2 13.7 7.0 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2016 2017 Change in 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 43.8 38.1 -5.8 
F -33.0 -34.2 -1.2 
Net Transfers -2.9 -2.9 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 8.0 1.0 -7.0 
as % of GNP 4.1 0.5 -3.3 
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The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview and Summary 
 
On foot of the substantial growth performance in 2015, the Irish economy looks 
set to continue to grow robustly in 2016. The economy as measured by GDP grew 
by 7.8 per cent in 2015; we expect that it will grow by 4.8 per cent in 2016. GNP, 
which grew by 5.7 per cent in 2015, is expected to increase by 5 per cent in the 
current year. Growth in 2016 is set to be heavily influenced by domestic factors 
with investment and consumption continuing to play a more central role in the 
overall growth performance of the domestic economy. 
 
Notwithstanding this, developments in international markets will also be crucially 
important for Ireland’s outlook. In Q1 2016 the United Kingdom Government 
decided on June of this year for the ‘Brexit’ referendum; the growing ambiguity 
concerning the outcome of this major decision merely serves to compound some 
of the international, macroeconomic risks posed to the domestic economy. In 
that regard the first quarter of 2016 has seen a significant degree of uncertainty 
concerning a number of issues. Much of this uncertainty was prompted towards 
the end of 2015 by renewed concern surrounding the large imbalances in the 
Chinese economy. However, more recently there have been worries about the 
asset quality of certain leading institutions in the European banking sector and 
nascent concerns about the growth performance of both the European and US 
economies in Q1 2016. This has led us to modify our growth forecasts for Irish 
trade down marginally in 2016; however developments in Q2 2016 will provide a 
firmer indication of whether these uncertainties are likely to have significant real 
economy impacts for our main trading partners.  
 
On the domestic front there is some uncertainty as well owing to the rather 
inconclusive nature of the recent General election. While the task of forming a 
stable government looks to be particularly challenging, in the short term at least 
it is unlikely there will be any adverse outcomes for the main economic and 
financial indicators. 
 
The Nowcasting model (summarised in the Appendix) indicates that, despite the 
growing uncertainty, the domestic economy still grew by 1.5 per cent between 
the final quarter of 2015 and the first quarter of the present year.  
 
We also release our first estimate of growth in 2017 for the Irish economy. In the 
previous Commentary we devoted a significant amount of attention to long-run 
trends amongst key Irish macroeconomic variables; namely in investment, the 
unemployment rate and the growth rate in total factor productivity. Based on 
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this we felt that the output gap would close in 2016. At present, we estimate the 
rate of Irish potential output growth to be approximately 3.5 per cent. Given the 
strength of growth in the economy at present, we forecast that both GDP and 
GNP will grow slightly stronger in 2017, by 4 per cent.  
 
In the International Section of the present Commentary we draw on earlier 
research by McQuinn and Whelan (2015)1 to place the issue of inward migration 
in the Euro Area in context. Population forecasts for the Euro Area compiled by 
EuroStat and presented in McQuinn and Whelan (2015) clearly demonstrate that 
Europe has an ageing population and crucially that this issue is impacting on the 
growth prospects for the different Member States right now. Importantly, in the 
absence of significant net inward migration, future European labour supply is 
likely to contract with clear, adverse implications for economic growth and living 
standards. While the Irish population is somewhat younger relative to the 
European average, the domestic economy will be subject to the same trends over 
time. 
 
Finally, as with previous Commentaries and reflecting the joint ESRI-BPFI/NAMA 
research programme, we present a number of papers on the crucial issue of 
housing supply. Inter alia, these studies examine the issue of heterogeneity in the 
regional housing supply rates (Morgenroth, 2016), while Barrett and Kelly (2016) 
conduct an initial examination of housing tenure and movement among Ireland’s 
older population using The Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing (TILDA).  
 
Based on these developments in the Irish housing market, we also address the 
proposed review of the macro-prudential measures introduced last year, which is 
to be conducted by the Central Bank of Ireland later in the year. As with Duffy 
and McQuinn (2015)2 we argue that any review should seek to place the 
implementation of this new important policy area on a rules basis which, 
crucially, takes cyclical developments in both the demand and the supply side of 
the housing market into consideration. 
 
 
                                                          
1  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan (2015). ‘Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms’, 
ESRI Working Paper No. 501. Available at www.esri.ie/pubs/WP501.pdf. 
2  Duffy, D. and K. McQuinn (2014). ‘Assessment of Proposed Macro-Prudential Policy Measures’, Appendix, Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, Winter 2014, ESRI. 
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The International Economy 
 
The international environment, as noted in the previous Commentary, is 
particularly volatile at the present time with vulnerabilities in China and other 
emerging economies continuing to reverberate throughout the global economy. 
 
All three of Ireland’s main trading partners – the Euro Area, the United States and 
the United Kingdom – registered positive output growth rates in 2015. In general 
the outlook for 2016 is also positive for all three economies; Figure 1 shows that 
in the Euro Area, real GDP is forecast to grow by 1.6 per cent in 2016 and 1.7 per 
cent in 2017. In the UK, positive growth rates of 1.5 and 1.2 per cent are expected 
in 2016 and 2017 respectively, although any possible Brexit following the 
referendum announced for June of this year will likely impact these forecasts. The 
US is expected to register the strongest growth of the three trading partners with 
a growth rate of 2 per cent anticipated in each of the next two years. 
Notwithstanding these outlooks, recent, more timely economic data do suggest a 
possible weakening in the growth performance of both the US and Europe in Q1 
2016. 
 
FIGURE 1 Real GDP Growth (% Change, Year-on-Year) 
  Euro Area    United States           United Kingdom 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
The Euro Area Economy  
According to a flash estimate published by Eurostat, seasonally-adjusted GDP 
rose by 0.3 per cent in both the Euro Area and the European Union during the 
fourth quarter of 2015, compared with the previous quarter. When compared to 
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the final quarter of 2014, seasonally-adjusted GDP rose by 1.5 per cent in the 
Euro Area and by 1.8 per cent in the European Union. Among the Member States 
for which data are available, Greece and Finland are the only two members to 
have recorded negative growth in two consecutive quarters. While overall growth 
in the Euro Area was positive in 2015 it is interesting to note that growth 
moderated somewhat over the course of the year, from 0.5 per cent quarter-on-
quarter growth in Q1 to 0.4 per cent in the second quarter and 0.3 per cent in the 
third quarter.  
 
In addition to this, recent Nowcast forecasts3 indicate that although growth 
appeared to strengthen in 2015, the momentum is now faltering because the 
Euro Area is affected, with a lag, by the slowdown in the US. The most current 
estimates for the first quarter of 2016 for the US and the Euro Area have 
converged and point to a disappointing annualised rate of growth of below 1.5 
per cent.  
 
Euro Area inflation was 0.3 per cent in January 2016, up from 0.2 per cent in 
December 2015 and -0.6 per cent in January 2015. Negative rates were observed 
in ten Member States. Compared with December 2015, annual inflation fell in 12 
Member States, remained stable in two and rose in 14. HICP inflation in 2015 
dropped further to zero, down from an already low 0.4 per cent in 2014. The 
deceleration was, however, solely due to lower energy prices. Consumer price 
inflation excluding energy actually accelerated during 2015, from 0.4 per cent in 
January to around 1 per cent at the end of the year. As noted in previous 
Commentaries, despite its drag on annual inflation, lower oil prices should 
continue to support consumption growth through the positive impact on 
household personal disposable income. 
 
Given that the outlook for inflation has weakened significantly, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) recently cut its main interest rate from 0.05 per cent to 0 per 
cent. This is the first interest rate cut made by the ECB since September 2014. The 
ECB will also continue with its programme of quantitative easing and has moved 
to increase its bond-buying programme from €60 billion per month to €80 billion 
per month. The long-term effects of these strategies should also be taken into 
account. For example, ECB bond purchases are distorting the market for Eurozone 
government debt. It is expected that if the ECB’s bond-buying continues at its 
current rate, the ECB and national central banks will own over 25 per cent of the 
entire Eurozone government bond market by the first half of 2017. As discussed in 
the Monetary and Financial section, a continuation of a negative or very low 
 
                                                          
3  See Caruso, A., T. Hasenzagl, F. Pellegrino and L. Reichlin, (2016). ‘The US sneezes and the Eurozone catches a cold: 
The Eurozone has been infected by the US slowdown’. Available at www.voxeu.org/article/how-eurozone-has-been-
infected-us-slowdown. 
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interest rate environment will also continue to impact the profitability of banks 
which may in turn have a negative effect on consumers. 
 
Seasonally-adjusted unemployment fell marginally in December 2015, down to 
10.4 per cent from 10.5 per cent in November 2015. This is the lowest rate 
recorded in the Euro Area since September 2011 and compares with a rate of 
11.4 per cent in December 2014. Among the Member States, the lowest 
unemployment rate in December 2015 was recorded in Germany at 4.5 per cent. 
The highest unemployment rates continue to be observed in Greece (24.5 per 
cent) and Spain (20.8 per cent). Compared to 12 months ago, the unemployment 
rate in December 2015 fell in 23 Member States, remained stable in one and 
increased in four. 
 
The recent significant increase in the inflow of refugees into Europe has 
prompted some analysis of the impact of this development on certain European 
countries’ economic outlook. For example, a recent Euroframe Report4 indicates 
that, in the case of Germany, the labour force has increased by an estimated 
70,000 persons in 2015 and is expected to rise by another 240,000 in 2016. It is 
worth noting however that these figures are relatively small in comparison to a 
labour force of 42 million people. 
 
FIGURE 2 Total Population in 15 to 64 Age Bracket (Euro Area, millions) 
 
Source:  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan, (2015). ‘Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms’,  
 ESRI Working Paper No. 501. Available at www.esri.ie/pubs/WP501.pdf. 
 
 
                                                          
4  See www.euroframe.org/files/user_upload/euroframe/docs/2016/EUROFRAME%20Report_2016.pdf. 
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In addressing the long-run implications of demographic trends on future 
European living standards, McQuinn and Whelan5 demonstrate that the ageing of 
the European population is having adverse implications for Europe’s growth 
prospects right now. This is due to the fact that, according to forecasts from 
Eurostat, the proportion of people in the key working age category 15-64 has 
already peaked (in 2010) and is set to decline significantly under a baseline 
scenario. Figure 2 illustrates future European demographic movements, while 
Figure 3 shows that the decline in the proportion of people in this age category is 
mirrored across individual European Member States. 
 
FIGURE 3 Proportion of Total Population in 15 to 64 Age Bracket (%) by Country 
 
Source:  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan, (2015). ‘Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms’,  
 ESRI Working Paper No. 501. Available at www.esri.ie/pubs/WP501.pdf. 
 
McQuinn and Whelan estimate6 that given the resulting implications for labour 
force growth, output and output per hour will increase by a meagre 0.4 and 0.6 
per cent per annum over the period 2014-2043. Crucially, McQuinn and Whelan 
argue that higher rates of inward migration, while politically difficult, may be 
necessary if Europe wishes to keep the supply of labour growing and economic 
growth rates from collapsing.  
 
The US Economy 
Real GDP increased at an annual rate of 1 per cent in the final quarter of 2015, 
according to the second estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
                                                          
5  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan, (2015). ‘Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms’, 
ESRI Working Paper No. 501. Available at www.esri.ie/pubs/WP501.pdf. 
6  Using plausible assumptions about future rates of unemployment and investment. 
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The economy grew at a rate of 2 per cent in the third quarter and expanded by 
2.4 per cent in 2015. First quarter GDP growth estimates are as high as 2.5 per 
cent, but the risks are tilted to the downside amid slowing world economies, a 
strong Dollar and a recent global stock market sell-off that has tightened financial 
market conditions. 
 
Concerns for US growth levels have also come from recent Purchasing Managers’ 
Index (PMI) data from Markit. Markit’s PMI survey data for February show a 
significant risk of the US economy falling into contraction in the first quarter of 
2016. The February reading is amongst the weakest since the recession with 
business activity in services falling for the first time since October 2013, 
accompanying a marked slowdown to near-stagnation in manufacturing. 
 
On a positive note, data from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics indicated that 
total non-farm payroll employment rose by 151,000 in January. Both the number 
of unemployed persons, at 7.8 million, and the unemployment rate, at 4.9 per 
cent, changed little in January. Over the past 12 months, the number of 
unemployed persons and the unemployment rate were down by 1.1 million and 
0.8 percentage points respectively. Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen has said 
the economy needs to create just under 100,000 jobs a month to keep up with 
growth in the working age population. The deceleration in employment growth in 
recent months could further undercut the case for a Federal Reserve interest rate 
hike in March. 
 
The minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) acknowledged that 
the labour market had strengthened since its December meeting, even as 
economic growth slowed in the fourth quarter of 2015. As a result inflation is 
expected to remain low in the near term, in part because of the further declines 
in energy prices, and is expected to rise to 2 per cent over the medium term. 
Given the economic outlook, the FOMC has maintained the target range for the 
federal funds rate at 0.25 to 0.5 per cent. The stance of monetary policy remains 
accommodative, thereby supporting further improvement in labour market 
conditions and a return to 2 per cent inflation. 
 
The UK Economy 
Gross Domestic Product in the UK is estimated, by the Office of National Statistics 
(ONS), to have increased by 0.5 per cent in the final quarter of 2015 compared 
with growth of 0.4 per cent in Q3 2015. When compared to the final quarter of 
2014, GDP was 1.9 per cent higher with an annual increase of 2.2 per cent in 2015 
over 2014. In Q4 2015, GDP was estimated to have been 6.6 per cent higher than 
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the pre-economic downturn peak of Q1 2008. From the peak in Q1 2008 to the 
trough in Q2 2009, the economy shrank by 6.1 per cent. 
 
Data released by the ONS indicate that 205,000 more people were employed in 
Q4 2015 compared to the previous quarter, with a total of 31.42 million people 
now in employment in the UK. The employment rate (the proportion of people 
aged from 16 to 64 in work) was 74.1 per cent, the highest since comparable 
records began in 1971. The unemployment rate continues to fall and now stands 
at 5.1 per cent, 0.6 per cent lower than for a year earlier. Despite the strong 
employment numbers, the UK continues to suffer from very low labour 
productivity. UK labour productivity as measured by output per hour grew by 0.5 
per cent from the second to the third quarter of 2015. By contrast, output per 
worker and output per job decreased by 0.2 and 0.1 per cent respectively, as a 
result of a decrease in average hours in Q3. Latest data from the ONS indicate 
that output per hour worked in the UK was 18 percentage points below the 
average for the remaining six members of the G7. This is the widest productivity 
gap since comparable records began in 1991.  
 
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose by 0.3 per cent in the year to January 2016, 
compared with a 0.2 per cent rise in the year to December 2015. This is the third 
consecutive month of small increases, with the rate in January 2016 being the 
same as it was in January 2015. The current inflation rate is still far behind the 
Bank of England target of 2 per cent. 
 
The governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, has indicated that if the UK 
economy worsens, the Bank of England will be in a position to respond with an 
interest rate cut or more quantitative easing. In light of subdued global growth, 
the first interest rate rise is now not expected to happen until 2017 at the very 
earliest. While Governor Carney has stated that one option open to the UK is to 
cut the interest rate further towards zero he has emphasised that the Bank of 
England has no intention of following Japan’s lead of introducing negative 
interest rates. 
 
Additional concerns for the British economy have arisen in light of the Brexit 
referendum date on 23 June. Sterling, for example, has fallen by nearly 7 per cent 
against the Dollar over the past three months due to concerns over the UK’s EU 
membership. In late February Sterling fell a full 2 per cent in one day, the biggest 
one-day decline for the currency since October 2009. Although the weakened 
Sterling is seen as a sign of stress in the UK economy, it may potentially help the 
low inflation rate, assuming strong overseas demand for UK goods and services. 
The possibility of a British exit of the EU is still a major uncertainty in the Euro 
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Area with a recent YouGov poll of 3,482 people revealing that the ‘leave’ 
campaign is one point ahead of the ‘remain’ with 38 per cent to 37 per cent.7 
 
As stated in the Winter Commentary, a British exit from the European Union 
remains one of the most prevalent risks to the Irish economy. A recent study by 
the ESRI8 determined the potential economic consequences of a ‘Brexit’ for 
Ireland with the evidence suggesting that Ireland’s interests are best served by 
the UK remaining within the EU.  
 
The World Economy 
In the first quarter of 2016 the global outlook remains subject to downside risks. 
The new tensions emerging in China’s financial markets at the beginning of this 
year and the renewed concerns about its domestic growth, matched with the 
deep recession in Brazil and the prolonged crisis in Russia all have an adverse 
impact on global growth expectations.  
 
Concerns about the Chinese economy persist into Q1 2016 and show little sign of 
abating. GDP growth moderated to 6.8 per cent for the final quarter of the year 
and to 6.9 per cent for 2015. The annual growth rate is the weakest in 25 years, 
and the quarterly level undershot market expectations, posting its lowest reading 
since the financial crisis. The tools traditionally utilised by governments to revive 
growth – infrastructure spending, easy credit and increased exports – appear 
increasingly ineffective in the case of the Chinese slowdown. 
 
The issues in China have generally extended globally through stock market 
uncertainty. During the first two weeks of 2016, the Shanghai Composite Index 
fell 18 per cent. The instability in the Chinese market has been linked to market 
confusion regarding the direction of the Renminbi exchange rate, following 
gradual but constant ten-day depreciation against the Dollar that fuelled capital 
outflows.  
 
These issues have fed into other global economies including Japan and the US 
where stock market volatility has been particularly high in recent months. Of 
these markets, banking stocks have been hit particularly hard. Italy’s third-biggest 
lender Monte Dei Paschi di Siena has lost 56 per cent of its share price in the first 
two months of 2016. Outside the Eurozone, the share price of British bank 
 
                                                          
7  See https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/02/24/yougov-view-eu-referendum-polling for more details. 
8  See Barrett A., A. Bergin, J. FitzGerald, D. Lambert, D. McCoy, E. Morgenroth, I. Siedschlag and Z. Studnicka, (2015). 
Scoping the Possible Economic Implications of Brexit on Ireland, ESRI Research Series. 
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Barclays has fallen by 30 per cent and Switzerland’s Credit Suisse by 40 per cent 
over the same period. 
 
In July 2015, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook 
forecast growth in 2016 of 3.8 per cent. This has since been revised downward in 
their most recent forecast to 3.4 per cent. Similarly, downward revisions have 
been made by the World Bank in their Global Economic Perspectives. In January 
2015 world growth in 2016 was forecast at 3.3 per cent. Twelve months later and 
the growth prospects for 2016 now stand at 2.9 per cent. In the Winter QEC we 
sought to quantify the effect on the Irish growth rate of a substantial global 
shock. Analysis by Bergin et al. (2013),9 determines that Irish GDP would fall by 
0.8 per cent in response to a 1 percentage point fall in world growth. Exports of 
goods and services would also fall by 3.2 per cent in the first year of the shock. As 
in previous Commentaries, it is worth highlighting the fact that any downside risk 
associated with the Chinese downturn would affect Ireland primarily through 
secondary markets such as the US, UK and the Euro Area. 
 
Oil prices remain stubbornly low in the first quarter of 2016. In mid-February 
prices rose more than 14 per cent in three days following a plan by Saudi Arabia 
and Russia, endorsed without commitment by Iran, to freeze oil output at 
January’s highs. The Saudi-Russian production freeze plan, also joined by Qatar 
and Venezuela, is the first such deal in 15 years between the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC members. It is difficult to 
say if this move will cause the price of oil to increase by any substantial amount 
over the coming year as the market is currently over-supplied by roughly two 
million barrels a day. Since the beginning of 2016 the price of Brent Crude Oil has 
settled at around US$35 per barrel, falling as low as US$26 in mid-January. In the 
12 months to the end of February 2016, the price per barrel has fallen some 44 
per cent (see Figure 4). 
 
 
                                                          
9  Bergin, A., T. Conefrey, J. FitzGerald, I. Kearney and N. Znuderl (2013). 'The Hermes-13 Macroeconomic Model of the 
Irish Economy', ESRI, Working Paper No. 460, July. 
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FIGURE 4 Oil Price US$ per Barrel (Brent – Europe; not seasonally adjusted)  
 
Source:  Federal Reserve of St. Louis. 
 
The most recent Euroframe report10 utilises the National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research’s structural global econometric model, NiGEM to analyse the 
effects on US, Japanese and Euro Area growth rates in response to a temporary/ 
permanent US$10 per barrel fall in oil prices. Estimates show that a temporary 
US$10 per barrel oil decline for two years provides a boost for GDP in the three 
areas. While there is a slight increase in GDP in the first year of the shock, the 
effect is more than doubled in all three areas before dissipating rapidly after the 
shock. 
 
In the event of a permanent decline in the oil price, the long-run simulated path 
of output remains permanently above the baseline, though the effect is lowest in 
the Euro Area. A permanent oil price decline will provide permanent output 
effects, which follow a fall in the terms of trade and the real long-term interest 
rate. 
 
Implications for Irish Exports, Imports and the Balance of Payments 
Ireland’s trade performance in 2015 has consisted of very strong growth in both 
imports and exports. Goods exports have grown by almost 20 per cent over the 
year largely spurred by competiveness gains from a weakening Euro as well as 
growth in major trading partners such as the UK and the US. Goods import 
growth was also solid, increasing by 10.1 per cent over the year. This culminated 
in a record annual trade surplus of just under €4 billion, an increase of 38.6 per 
cent over the year. Once again the largely multinational pharmaceutical sector 
played a leading role in the observed growth, with exports of medical and 
 
                                                          
10  See www.euroframe.org/files/user_upload/euroframe/docs/2016/EUROFRAME%20Report_2016.pdf. 
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pharmaceutical products increasing by 36 per cent or €7.945 billion over the year, 
largely as a result of a weakened Euro increasing profitability.  
 
Although much of the growth originated in the pharmaceutical sector, there was 
a broad range of growth in many of other sectors. Figure 5 shows the growth 
observed in both imports and exports in some of the main exporting sectors. As 
we can see, there was robust growth in most of the main sectors. As far as 
exports are concerned, there was a decrease in growth in two of the main 
sectors, including crude materials, inedible, except fuels of -1.0 per cent (year-on-
year) and minerals, fuels and related materials of -6.1 per cent, partly as a result 
of depressed oil prices. 
 
FIGURE 5 Export and Import Growth in Selected Trading Sectors Dec 2014-Dec 2015 (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figure 6 shows the relative proportion of Ireland’s exports and imports in relation 
to our major trading partners. The UK and the US remain our single biggest 
trading partners in 2015 and together accounted for approximately 40 per cent of 
our exports and 36 per cent of our imports. China accounts for approximately 2 
per cent of our total goods exports and so a slowdown in China would have 
minimal direct effects on Ireland’s growth. However, as mentioned in previous 
Commentaries, the indirect effect of a global slowdown in growth as a result of 
weakening growth and demand in China could have a substantial effect on 
Ireland’s growth by way of a slowdown in growth in our major trading partners. 
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FIGURE 6 Goods Exports and Imports by Geographic Region 2015 
  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The openness of Ireland’s economy means that our trade sector is a vital 
component for economic growth. This is clear when one compares the evolution 
of total volume of exports to GDP compared to other selected OECD countries 
(Figure 7). The volume of exports in Ireland has become larger than our GDP since 
2000 and as of 2014 stands at 114 per cent, almost three times the European 
average. As mentioned above, although there is growth across most sectors of 
the economy, the majority of the growth in goods exports is concentrated in the 
chemical and related products commodity group which includes pharmaceutical 
and medical products. In 2015 this sector accounted for approximately 57 per 
cent of total goods exports. Having growth skewed towards a relatively small 
number of sectors certainly presents a source of risk to the economy especially if 
negative shocks to these sectors were to occur. Ideally, growth would be more 
evenly distributed so as to diversify some of the risk building up in this area. 
 
FIGURE 7 Comparison of Total Exports to GDP Ratio for Selected Countries 
 
 
Source:  World Bank Data. 
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The impact of contract manufacturing on trade statistics has been mentioned in 
previous Commentaries. Recent research11 quantifies the likely effect that this 
has on goods exports in the last few years and suggests that in 2014 goods 
exports grew by 6.1 per cent when an adjustment was made for contract 
manufacturing, down from 12.1 per cent without the adjustment. Perdue and 
Huang (2015) also estimate the effect for 2015 and suggest the growth rate of 
goods exports to be 15 per cent excluding contract manufacturing. Although the 
effect is still present and distorts the data, there was still quite robust real growth 
in exports in Ireland in 2015. 
 
If we decompose exports into the contribution from goods and services as in 
Figure 8, we can see that historically goods made up the vast majority of exports. 
In 2003 for example, goods exports accounted for approximately 68 per cent of 
total exports. In recent years we can see that the relative contribution from 
service exports has increased and as of 2014 was approximately 46 per cent of 
the total.  
 
Imports are also distorted by the presence of large multinationals in Ireland. In 
particular, factors such as intellectual property rights and research and 
development are inflating import levels. These factors also distort the level of 
investment making the growth rates in these aggregates quite volatile. This may 
be a significant feature in the National Accounts in 2016 given the pending 
merger of Pfizer and Allergen. The overall impact on GDP, however, is minimal as 
the rise in both imports and investment tend to offset each other. 
 
                                                          
11  Perdue, D. and H. Huang, (2015). ‘Irish Exports: The facts, the fiction and the risks’. National Treasury Management 
Agency (NTMA) report. 
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FIGURE 8  Decomposition of Export Growth into Goods and Services Exports 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office Quarterly National Accounts, 2016-2017 ESRI forecasts. 
 
Apart from the possibility of a global slowdown in trade in 2016, the main source 
of risk for our trade outlook stems from Britain’s potential exit from the EU 
(Brexit). If Brexit were to occur this would certainly worsen the outlook for 
Ireland’s trade in 2017. While there would be negative effects if Brexit were to 
occur, there are also upside risks as it may lead to an increase in FDI as Ireland 
captures some of the relocating FDI with our low corporate tax rate and access to 
the EU market; however the effect of any increase in FDI is expected to be small. 
 
The Balance of Payments release for Q4 2015 shows a current account balance 
surplus of €2,773 million. The total surplus for 2015 was €9,548 million or 4.4 per 
cent of GDP, an increase of €2,715 million on 2014. Annual service trade is up 
substantially in 2015. In particular, service imports grew by 20 per cent in the 
year to Q4 2015. The largest growth occurred in royalties and licences at 25 per 
cent and accounted for just under half the growth in overall service imports. 
Robust growth was also observed in business services of 16 per cent and financial 
services of 13 per cent. 
 
Total service exports also experienced robust growth across the majority of 
sectors in the year to Q4 2015. Computer services, which accounted for 
approximately 48 per cent of total service exports, grew by 17 per cent when 
compared to Q4 2015. As well as this, financial services and business services 
exports increased by 25 and 12 per cent respectively. There were also decreases 
observed in repairs and processing of -21 per cent and communications of -6 per 
cent. These sectors contribute a relatively small proportion of the total and were 
more than offset by the strong growth in the other sectors. The result was overall 
growth in total service exports in the year to Q4 2015 of 15 per cent.  
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The strengthening of US and UK currencies in 2015 partly reflected the relatively 
strong economic performance of those economies, which further boosted 
demand for Irish goods and services. Figure 9 displays the percentage change in 
the real effective exchange rate from August 2014 to August 2015. It is clear to 
see that within the Euro Area, Ireland is benefiting most from the weak Euro. 
Both the Dollar and Sterling appreciated sharply vis-à-vis the Euro in the past 12 
months. On average in 2014, one Euro would get US$1.33, this dropped to 
US$1.10 in 2015. Similarly the Euro/Sterling exchange rate for one Euro fell from 
£0.81 to £0.73.  
 
FIGURE 9 Annual Change in Real Effective Exchange Rate (%) (August 2014-August 2015) 
Sources:  World Bank staff calculations based on Datastream and IMF International Finance Statistics data. 
Note:  Real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure of the value of a currency against a weighted 
 average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator or index of costs. 
 
Growth in exports is set to continue in 2016, driven mainly by favourable external 
factors such as the weak Euro and modest growth in our major trading partners 
feeding into strong demand for our exports. As well as this, recent high frequency 
trade indicators also suggest growth in goods and services traded is set to 
continue to remain positive moving into 2016. However, in light of the global 
trade uncertainty and expected lower emerging market demand, we forecast 
growth in exports to moderate somewhat at 8.9 per cent in 2016, growing a 
further 6.7 per cent in 2017. Given the recent increase in employment and 
growth in the domestic economy, we also expect import growth to continue into 
2016, albeit at a somewhat more moderate rate than 2015, at 11.9 per cent and a 
further 10.4 per cent in 2017.  
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The Domestic Economy 
 
Output 
The domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially review 
the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish monetary 
and financial sectors. Prices and earnings in the economy are then discussed, 
followed by a review of demand-side factors such as consumption and housing 
market issues. On the supply side, we then examine developments in investment and 
the labour market before concluding with an analysis of the public finances. 
 
In 2015 the Irish economy grew by a substantial 7.8 per cent. Figure 10 compares the 
performance of the Irish economy with the output growth rates of a select cross-
country sample. The relatively strong performance by the Irish economy in an 
international context is readily apparent. Of interest also in the graph is that the US 
and UK, both key trading partners of the Irish economy, also experienced relatively 
strong growth rates, particularly by European standards. 
 
We believe that the Irish economy will continue to experience strong growth in 2016 
with GDP set to grow by 4.8 per cent and GNP increasing by 5 per cent. While the 
world trade outlook is somewhat uncertain with vulnerabilities in the Chinese 
economy becoming increasingly more apparent, the growth outlook for Ireland’s 
major trading partners still remains positive.  
 
The Nowcasting model (summarised in the Appendix), which was particularly 
accurate in tracking movements in the Irish economy through 2015, indicates that 
the domestic economy grew by nearly 1.5 per cent for Q1 2016 following an increase 
of 2.7 per cent in Q4 2015.  
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Figure 10 2015 GDP Growth Rates (%) for a Select Cross-Country Sample
 
 
 
Source:  AMECO estimates. 
 
One aspect of the recent Irish performance however, which is apparent from Figure 
11, is that the dynamics of the recovery appear to be shifting somewhat; the initial 
phase of the post-2012 performance was very much dominated by export-led growth 
with domestic sources such as investment and consumption contributing from 2014 
onwards. Last year in particular saw a strong contribution from consumption, with 
Irish households increasing their purchases of goods and services by the largest 
amount since 2007. Our expectation is that this trend will continue through 2016 and 
into 2017 with domestic sources of growth increasingly to the fore in generating 
overall economic activity.  
 
Figure 11 Domestic and External Sources of Irish GDP Growth (%)
 
 
 
Source:  QEC estimates. 
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In the last Commentary we compared the actual rates of activity in the economy for 
investment, total factor productivity and the labour market with their corresponding 
long-run trends. This, in turn, enabled us to estimate the current output gap for the 
Irish economy. In light of the expected strong performance of the economy in 2016, 
we believe the output gap will close this year. Consequently, this would result in the 
economy returning to the potential output growth rate next year, which we estimate 
is approximately 3.5 per cent. Nonetheless, in light of the strength of the recovery in 
the present year, we feel growth next year will be in excess of this at 4 per cent.  
 
Monetary and Financial Conditions 
The most recent Quarterly Financial Accounts show a further improvement in 
household circumstances. Figure 12 shows both the total level of household debt in 
the economy and the ratio of debt to income. The graph shows that total household 
debt decreased in Q3 2015, falling to €151.2 billion or €32,614 per capita, and is the 
lowest level reached since Q1 2006. This is equivalent to a €2.1 billion or 1.3 per cent 
decline over the quarter. Overall, households’ debt positions have improved by 25.8 
per cent since their peak of €203.7 billion at Q3 2008. A significant improvement in 
the debt to disposable income ratio was also observed for the quarter, falling to 
160.4 per cent or a decline of 6.4 percentage points. The trend seems to be 
continuing downwards showing marked improvements in household balance sheets. 
 
Figure 12 Irish Household Debt as % of GDP (2002-2015)
 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and Central Bank of Ireland. 
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As well as this continued deleveraging, household net worth12 rose to €617.6 billion 
or €133,225 per capita during Q3 2015. This 2.9 per cent increase reflects both an 
increase in housing asset values as well as a further decrease in household liabilities 
and marks a cumulative increase of 39.1 per cent since its lowest level of €444 billion 
in Q2 2012. 
 
Figure 13  Growth in Lending to Irish Households 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
As pointed out in the last Commentary, although the growth rate of credit extended 
to households remains negative, we do see the negative rate beginning to level off. 
The negative rate of growth reflects the significant deleveraging undertaken by 
households over the last few years but this rate of decline seems to be significantly 
moderating over the past year. This is especially true in the growth rate of lending 
for consumption purposes which likely reflects that some households are borrowing 
to fund the large increase in consumption that was observed in 2015. This trend is 
also consistent with the record high levels observed in the KBC/ESRI Consumer 
Sentiment Index over recent months. As we expect consumption to continue to 
increase in 2016, it is highly likely that changes in credit for consumption purposes 
will register positive growth next year for the first time since early 2009.  
 
The number of mortgage accounts in arrears for principal dwelling houses (PDH) 
declined again in Q3 2015. There were a total of 92,291 or 12.3 per cent of accounts 
in arrears at the end of Q3 2015 representing a 6 per cent decline over the previous 
quarter and is the ninth consecutive quarter that the rate has fallen. Figure 14 shows 
 
                                                          
12  Household net worth is calculated as the sum of household housing and financial assets minus their liabilities. The Central 
Bank of Ireland estimate of housing assets is based on the size and value of housing stock. Data on the value of housing 
are obtained from the CSO’s ‘Residential Property Price Index’ (RPPI).  
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the percentage of total loans in arrears for over 90 days and for over 180 days. There 
has been a clear downward trend in both series over the last two years showing that 
households seem to be catching up on mortgage repayments. This likely reflects the 
general improvement in the unemployment rate and the wider labour market as well 
as the continuing increase in restructuring arrangements implemented by banks to 
provide an opportunity for households to repay their mortgages. There was a total 
stock of 120,806 PDH mortgage accounts categorised as restructured at end-
September 2015. This trend continues in the buy-to-let market with mortgages in 
arrears of over 90 days falling 4.5 per cent over the quarter. 
 
Figure 14 Select Mortgage Arrears Rates (%): Q3 2009-Q2 2015 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
Figure 15 shows the growth rates in lending to Irish Non-Financial Corporations 
(NFCs). The pace of lending to Irish NFCs in the pre-crisis years was among the 
highest in the Euro Area and was mainly driven by property-related lending. Post- 
crisis the growth in lending slowed, with all maturities turning eventually negative. 
Most recent data show that both short-term and long-term NFC’s loans have been 
declining for the last two years. Although overall lending to NFCs showed an annual 
decline of 7.4 per cent in December, an interesting trend has emerged of late in 
lending for medium-term loans of one to five years. The rate turned positive in early 
2015 and has continued to increase on an annual basis. In December 2015 there was 
a growth rate of 15 per cent recorded in loans of medium maturity. 
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Figure 15  Year-on-Year Growth Rate (%) of Lending to Irish Resident Non-Financial Corporations: Q1 2007-Q2 
2015 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
Given that many small medium enterprises (SMEs) in Ireland are indigenous and 
many of them rely on financing to a greater extent than large multinationals, it is 
informative to look at the level of credit extended to them. Overall the outstanding 
stock of credit advanced to Irish SMEs by resident credit institutions decreased 11.4 
per cent in the year to end-Q3 2015, to stand at €47.4 billion, and is the thirteenth 
consecutive quarterly decline. There were however, year-over-year growth rates 
observed in certain sectors. In particular, Central Bank data for Q3 2015 show that 
there were significant growth rates in credit observed in certain manufacturing 
sectors and information and communication sectors.  
 
Financial markets, particularly in Europe, have been experiencing significantly more 
volatility in the beginning of 2016. Much of the volatility has related directly to bank 
stocks, with Deutsche Bank, Barclays, and Credit Suisse losing 40, 30 and 40 per cent 
of their market values respectively (Figure 16), while the Eurostoxx index of 
European banks is down 27 per cent this year.13 This partly reflects the deterioration 
of banks’ balance sheets in recent months due to non-performing loans. Ordinarily 
banks would be able to offset some of these losses with profits but the current 
protracted low interest rate environment as a result of the ECB’s expansionary 
monetary policy is arguably reducing bank profitability, making it significantly more 
difficult to build up adequate capital.  
 
 
                                                          
13  As of 15 February 2016. 
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Another issue which has caused uncertainty amongst European financial institutions 
are contingent convertible bonds (CoCos). These products are a type of bond that 
typically offers a higher interest rate to investors. The downside of this is that the 
bonds can be converted into equity by the banks who issue them if they start to 
make losses. This directly transfers the risk from the banks to the bondholders. These 
kinds of financial instruments have become very popular in recent years as banks 
could raise capital without diluting current shareholders. The value of Deutsche Bank 
CoCos has plummeted in recent weeks suggesting increased investor uncertainty and 
potential increased financial market turmoil in the months ahead. Given the 
interconnectedness of banks with the global financial system and the real 
economy,14 issues about such new financial instruments may compound existing 
concerns about the health of the European banking sector. Of particular concern in 
the coming months is the extent to which these financial market considerations may 
impact on real economy indicators. 
 
Figure 16 Selected Bank Stock Price (US$, Adjusted Close) 
 
 
Source:  Yahoo Finance. 
 
Prices and Earnings 
The monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI) fell significantly in January by 0.8 per cent 
compared to the December reading. This is the most significant monthly decrease 
since January 2015 where it also fell by 0.8 per cent. The sectors contributing to the 
largest decrease were clothing and footwear, transport and furnishings, household 
equipment and routine household maintenance falling by 0.44, 0.28 and 0.11 per 
cent respectively. The largest increase (0.14 per cent) was due to alcoholic beverages 
and tobacco. 
 
 
                                                          
14  Čihák, M., Muñoz, S., and R. Scuzzarella (2011), ‘The Bright and the Dark Side of Cross-Border Banking Linkages,’ IMF 
Working Paper No. 11/186. 
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Compared to January 2015, prices as measured by the CPI were 0.1 per cent higher. 
Figure 17 shows the annual percentage change in inflation over the last two years. 
Negative annual rates were observed for nearly all months of 2015 with the 
exception of August where the rate was 0.0 per cent and December where the rate 
was marginally positive at 0.1 per cent. External factors such as weak commodity 
prices and, in particular, lower oil prices continue to exert significant downward 
pressure on inflation. The sub index excluding energy has been consistently higher 
than the headline rate since the start of 2015 and most recently the annual growth 
rate was 0.6 per cent.  
 
Figure 17 Annual Growth in Inflation (%)  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Some of the major changes in the index over the year included increases of 
miscellaneous goods and services, education, communications and restaurants and 
hotels of 4, 3.8, 1.7 and 1.5 per cent respectively. As well as this, decreases occurred 
in clothing and footwear of 4.1 per cent, transport of 2.5 per cent and food and non-
alcoholic beverages of 0.9 per cent.  
 
The overall headline rate of inflation can be somewhat opaque, and decomposing 
the index into goods and services components can be more informative for 
uncovering developments in prices over the year. Figure 18 provides a simple 
decomposition of the CPI into the contributions to the growth from goods and the 
growth from services. There is a clear and significant divergence in the growth rates 
of each component. The goods component has experienced consistent negative 
growth over the sample, partially due to lower oil and commodity prices experienced 
in the last two years. Interestingly, services growth has been consistently positive 
since January 2014 and as of January 2016 the annual growth rate was 1.9 per cent 
while the comparable rate for the goods component was -2.9 per cent. 
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Figure 18  Decomposition of Annual (%) CPI Growth into Goods and Services Growth  
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The Harmonised Consumer Price Index (HICP) is designed to allow for cross-country 
comparisons of inflation within Europe. It aims to be representative of the 
developments in the prices of all goods and services available for purchase within the 
Euro Area for the purposes of directly satisfying consumer needs. Annual HICP in 
January remained unchanged from the January 2015 figure. The most notable 
changes in the year included education of 3.8 per cent; housing, water, electricity, 
gas and other fuels of 1.8 per cent; and communications of 1.7 per cent. The largest 
decreases were in clothing and footwear of 4.1 per cent and transport of 2.7 per cent 
attributed to sales and cheaper oil prices. 
 
Preliminary estimates for earnings and labour costs show that Average Hourly 
Earnings fell annually by 0.5 per cent down to €21.94 in Q4 2015. Although quite 
volatile, the quarterly figure shows an increase of 2.2 per cent from Q3 to Q4 2015. 
There was an increase in Average Hourly Earnings in seven of the 13 main sectors in 
the year to Q4 2015. Of these, the largest increase was in the administrative and 
support services sector from €16.62 to €17.20 or 3.5 per cent. The largest decrease 
was observed in the financial, insurance and real estate sector, falling from €31.17 to 
€28.83 per hour or -7.5 per cent. It should be noted that some of these changes may 
be due to compositional issues. 
 
Varied results in Average Annual Hourly Earnings were observed according to the 
size of firms. Enterprises with less than 50 employees showed an annual decrease of 
0.4 per cent while there was annual growth in enterprises of 50 to 250 employees of 
0.1 per cent. The largest firms, of 250 plus, experienced an annual decrease in 
Average Hourly Earnings of 0.9 per cent in Q4. There were also declines in both 
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public and private sector pay where earnings fell by 0.1 and 0.7 per cent respectively. 
This decrease is most likely due to compositional effects such as older, higher paid 
individuals retiring resulting in lower average wages in the public sector. 
 
After a marginally negative rate of annual growth in the CPI in 2015 we forecast 
positive CPI growth in 2016 of 1.0 per cent as the ECB’s monetary easing is expected 
to support increases in inflation in the Euro Area and as aggregate demand rises due 
to increased domestic activity, with strong consumption growth expected to 
continue into the present year. We also expect growth to be supported by a 
moderation in the fall of energy prices, as OPEC is expected to cut production of oil 
in 2016, which should ease the downward pressure in the energy component of the 
CPI. The relative weakness of the Euro to the Dollar and Pound and continuing 
import growth is also expected to contribute to inflation and we expect a further 
increase of inflation of 1 per cent in 2017. 
 
TABLE 1  Inflation Measures 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 Annual Change 
 % % % % 
CPI 0.2 -0.3 1.0 1.0 
Personal Consumption Deflator 1.7 0.4 1.0 1.0 
HICP 0.3 0.0 1.2 2.2 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI forecasts. 
 
Figure 19 plots average wages against the unemployment rate. Ordinarily wage 
growth and unemployment are negatively correlated15 as we can see from the graph. 
Indeed, steady growth in average wages was observed up until 2008, after which 
there was a large increase in unemployment followed by a fall in average wages. The 
recent fall in unemployment in 2014 and 2015 suggests that wages may well begin to 
recover in 2016. As well as this, recent tax data, particularly better than expected 
increases in income tax receipts, suggest a potential pickup in earnings in 2016. 
 
 
                                                          
15  Simple calculation reveals correlation of unemployment and wage growth of -0.87 for the whole sample. 
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FIGURE 19 Average Wages vs. Unemployment  
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Demand 
Household Sector Consumption  
Preliminary National Accounts show that personal consumption in 2015 grew by 3.8 
per cent in value and by 3.5 per cent in volume. The value of retail sales rose by 4.9 
per cent in 2015 and the volume by 8.2 per cent. The strength of consumer demand 
in the final quarter of 2015 ensures that there will be a significant carryover of retail 
sales growth into 2016. If the retail sales index merely maintained its fourth quarter 
2015 level throughout 2016, the annual volume of retail sales would be 2.1 per cent 
higher than last year. 
 
Indicators for the range of factors influencing personal consumption point to a 
continuation of the growth in 2015. As outlined in the Labour Market section, 
employment is set to continue to increase, accompanied by a falling unemployment 
rate. Growth in disposable income is also forecast to improve and to become more 
widespread across sectors. Consumer sentiment, as measured by the KBC Bank/ESRI 
Consumer Sentiment Index has increased steadily since the early months of 2013. 
Thus, it is forecast that the volume of personal consumption will grow by close to 3.8 
per cent in 2016 and by 3.5 per cent in 2017. 
 
Public consumption or ‘net expenditure by central and local government on current 
goods and services’ contracted marginally in 2015, in contrast to the other categories 
of expenditure. A return to moderate volume growth of 1 per cent is forecast for 
2016 and 2017. 
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Property Market Developments 
CSO data show that house prices nationally were 0.5 per cent lower in January than 
the previous month. Despite this fall, residential property prices were 7.6 per cent 
higher than the previous year. The data point to a difference in regional 
performance. In Dublin residential property prices decreased by 1.2 per cent in 
January and were 3.4 per cent higher than a year ago. The price of residential 
properties outside Dublin rose by 0.1 per cent in January, and was 11.4 per cent 
higher than in January 2015. The PRTB/ESRI Rent Index shows that rents were close 
to 10 per cent higher in Quarter 4, 2015 than they had been a year previously. The 
indices point to a slowdown in the quarterly growth rate, from 3.6 per cent 
nationally in Q3 to 2.2 per cent in Q4. However, this has been a feature of rental 
growth in recent years, with weaker growth in the fourth quarter, following high 
activity levels in Quarter 3, consistent with the demand for student accommodation 
in that time period. 
 
The stock of outstanding household mortgage debt amounted to €91.6 billion in 
January. In the year to January, mortgage loans declined at a rate of 2.5 per cent, 
with households repaying €1.9 billion more than was advanced in new loans. Based 
on the growth in house prices reported in the December Residential Property Price 
Index, we have updated our estimates of the number of mortgages in negative 
equity to take account of the growth in house prices to end-2015. The analysis shows 
a fall in the number of mortgages in negative equity to below 100,000 for the first 
time since 2008, to 99,950.  
 
Figure 20 Number of Mortgages in Negative Equity, December 2015 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
Recently the Central Bank of Ireland announced a review of the macro-prudential 
regulations, to take place in Summer 2016. House price growth has slowed since the 
introduction of the rules, although this may reflect the impact of affordability 
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constraints, as well as tighter lending rules. We have previously argued that the 
macro-prudential measures be implemented on a rules basis, enabling cyclical 
considerations to be taken into account when setting limits. The proposed review 
represents an opportunity to adopt such rules which would aid the accountability 
and transparency of macro-prudential policy in Ireland.  
 
Supply 
Investment 
The investment component of economic growth remains a difficult sector to forecast 
given that it is subject to one-off investments which can be large in nature. Data 
from the CSO show that the increase in investment was very strong in 2015, with 
volume growth of over 28 per cent and the value of gross domestic fixed capital 
formation increasing by 29.4 per cent, with the purchase of intellectual property 
rights contributing to the strength of investment in 2015. However, we continue to 
expect that investment will make a significant contribution to the domestic economy 
over the forecast period. Indicators for residential building and construction suggest 
that activity levels will increase, although at a moderate pace. Morgenroth (2016) in 
a Research Note published in this Commentary finds a causal relationship from 
completions to planning permissions, which might suggest that the receipts from 
completed developments are needed to commence the planning of new 
developments.  
 
Figure 21 Housing Market Indicators 
 
 
Source:  Department of Environment, Community and Local Government. 
 
Combined with public capital spending and growth in the amount of commercial 
property floor-space under construction, we forecast that the volume of investment 
in building and construction will grow by close to 13 per cent in 2016 and by close to 
17 per cent in 2017.  
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Investment in machinery and equipment has been boosted in recent years due to 
aircraft purchases. However, steady growth in the economy and the need to 
undertake previously deferred investment should see a continuation of growth in 
this component of investment. In the absence of the one-off factors mentioned, the 
growth is likely to be more moderate than in 2015, although still strong at 26.3 per 
cent in volume in 2016 and 23.7 per cent in 2017. Thus, our forecast for the growth 
in overall investment is 22.5 per cent in real terms this year, followed by further 
growth of close to 22.1 per cent in 2017. Following empirical work conducted in the 
last Commentary our expectation is that residential investment will pick up 
somewhat in 2017 and 2018.  
 
Labour Market 
The latest Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) release shows that 
employment growth in the final quarter of 2015 was somewhat slower than in the 
first three quarters. Nonetheless, there was still quarter-on-quarter growth of 0.2 
per cent culminating in an annual increase of 2.3 per cent. This represents an annual 
increase of 44,100 bringing total employment levels to 1,983,300, the highest level of 
employment in seven years. The growth consisted of an increase in both male and 
female employment of 1.8 and 2.8 per cent, or 18,900 and 25,200 respectively.  
 
Between Q3 and Q4 there was an increase in the number of those full-time 
employed by 0.2 per cent as well as an increase in the number of part-time 
employed of 0.4 per cent. The results for the year are also positive with growth of 
full-time employment of 2.6 per cent and growth in part-time employment of 1.2 per 
cent. The relatively high proportion of full-time employment rather than part-time 
over the year is a sign of robustness in the labour market, as full-time employment 
provides higher certainty and stability for employees and the wider economy. 
 
Looking at the various sectoral changes over the quarter suggests a broad 
improvement with increases of employment in 12 of the 14 sectors. The largest 
annual increase was in the construction sector, increasing by 9,900 or 8.5 per cent 
and now stands at 126,600. Some other notable increases were observed in 
accommodation and food services of 4.0 per cent and public administration and 
defence of 4.7 per cent. The two sectors experiencing a reduction in the annual 
employment included the financial, insurance and real estate activities and 
education of -3.9 and -0.4 respectively. 
 
Table 2 shows the annual change in thousands and the annual percentage change in 
employment for all Irish regions. In Q4 2015 annual growth in employment occurred 
in six of the eight regions, and there were only two where growth rates fell on an 
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annual basis. The West experienced a decrease of 2,500 or 1.5 per cent while the 
Mid-East experienced a decrease of 2,100 or 0.9 per cent. Although there was 
growth in most of the regions, some of these were only marginal such as growth in 
the Mid-West of 0.2 per cent and in the South East of 0.4 per cent. As well as an 
increase in employment between Q4 2014 and Q4 2015, there were also falls in 
unemployment observed in all regions bar the West where the increase in the 
number of unemployed people was relatively small at 200.  
 
Developments in the labour market become clearer if we consider growth over the 
period when the labour market began to pick up in Q4 2012 through to Q4 2015. 
Although there is quite a range of changes and different bases, Table 2 suggests 
some improvement in employment on a regional basis over the three years. There 
was, however a decline in employment in the West of Ireland between these two 
periods. 
 
TABLE 2 Employment Growth by Region 
Employment (000's) Q4 2012 Q4 2014 Q4 2015 2012-2015  
(% change) 
2014-2015  
(% change) 
Border 171.5 185.8 195.0 13.7 5.0 
Midland 105.7 113.7 120.8 14.3 6.2 
West 180.9 181.1 178.6 -1.3 -1.5 
Dublin 556.3 587.5 610.4 9.7 3.9 
Mid-East 225.5 237.9 235.8 4.6 -0.9 
Mid-West 150.1 152.8 153.1 2.0 0.2 
South East 181.8 204.5 205.4 13.0 0.4 
South West 277.0 275.6 283.9 2.5 3.0 
State 1,848.9 1,938.9 1,983.0 7.3 2.3 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The latest data from the CSO show the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rates fell 
from 9.2 to 9.1 percent between Q3 and Q4 2015. This compares to a rate of 10.4 
per cent in Q4 2014 and is the tenth successive quarter where the rate has fallen. 
There was an improvement in both male and female levels of unemployment over 
the year to Q4 2015. Seasonally-adjusted male unemployment decreased by 12,900 
or 9.1 per cent to 127,400 while female unemployment decreased by 14,300 or 17.2 
per cent to 68,600. 
 
Another indication of the robust recovery in the labour market is the significant 
decrease in the amount of people considered long-term unemployed. In the year to 
Q4 2015, the number of persons classified as long-term unemployed decreased by 
21,300 or 17.2 per cent, while the number of short-term unemployed decreased by 
6,100 or 7.2 per cent. Figure 22 shows the relative proportions of people in long-
term (more than one year) and short-term (below one year) unemployment. It is 
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clear that the financial crisis and subsequent construction sector collapse had a 
significant negative impact on overall levels of unemployment. It seemed however, 
to have a relatively larger negative impact on long-term versus short-term 
unemployment. At its highest level, long-term unemployment accounted for 63 per 
cent of the total level. Given the negative outcomes16 associated with high long-term 
unemployment, its decline in recent years is a welcome development. The 
proportion that consists of long-term unemployment is still very high relative to pre-
crisis levels however, and currently accounts for the largest proportion of the total at 
approximately 54 per cent. The government employment activation programme 
JobPath which caters mainly for people who are long-term unemployed and assists 
them obtaining full-time employment is expected to lower the level of long-term 
unemployment in 2016. 
 
FIGURE 22 Levels of Employment by Duration (000’s) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The overall youth unemployment rate (15-24 years old) remains a concern given its 
relatively high level compared to historic levels. This has fallen significantly over the 
past few years and more recently fell from 20.3 per cent in Q4 2014 to 18.9 per cent 
in Q4 2015 which is marginally below the EU average of 19.7 per cent. This decrease 
is, however, partly driven by falls in participation rates among this age group. 
 
As well as the QNHS unemployment figure, the seasonally-adjusted monthly 
unemployment figure published by the CSO has continued to decline suggesting a 
significant improvement in the labour market. The monthly rate for February has 
fallen by 2,000 down to 8.8 per cent as seen in Figure 23. Although Ireland has seen a 
marked improvement in the unemployment rate in the last year, it is still only at the 
 
                                                          
16  See Nichols, A., J. Mitchell and S. Lindner (2013). Consequences of long-term unemployment. Washington, DC: The Urban 
Institute. 
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European average. As of Q3 2015 the unadjusted unemployment rate among the 
EU28 was 9.0 per cent while the comparable rate for Ireland was 9.3 per cent. The 
lowest unemployment rate was observed in Germany of 4.4 per cent while the 
highest was observed in Greece at 24.1 per cent. 
 
FIGURE 23  Seasonally-Adjusted Monthly Unemployment Rate (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The overall picture, however, does point to continuing improvements in the labour 
market in 2016 as the domestic economy continues to improve and as Ireland 
remains an attractive prospect for foreign direct investment. We therefore expect 
the unemployment rate to continue to decline and reach an annual average of 8.7 
per cent in 2016, falling further to 7.7 per cent by the end of 2017. The annual 
growth in participation was relatively small in Q4 2015 at 0.2 per cent; however, this 
is an improvement over recent quarters where it has remained static. As 
employment growth can typically lag GDP growth, we expect the surge in economic 
activity in 2015 to feed into employment in the coming year, and expect growth to 
be 2.0 per cent in 2016 and to grow a further 1.8 per cent in 2017. One of the biggest 
considerations in the likely path of future unemployment rates is developments in 
the housing market. Based on analysis conducted in the previous Commentary, our 
expectation is that housing supply will start to escalate somewhat in 2017 and 2018. 
This is expected to exert significant downward pressure on the unemployment rate 
at that point.  
 
Public Finances 
While full-year National Account tax revenue and government expenditure numbers 
are not yet available, all indications from the Government Finance Statistics for the 
first three quarters and the Exchequer returns for the year show that 2015 
represented another significant improvement in the public finances. The Exchequer 
returns show that tax revenue was up 11 per cent on the previous year, much higher 
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than had been anticipated at the start of 2015. This is due to a number of factors 
including strong economic activity and employment growth, but also a much higher 
level of corporation tax receipts. Exchequer returns to December show that net 
voted current expenditure was 0.8 per cent higher in 2015. Based on these trends we 
estimate that the general government deficit reduced to €3.4 billion, with the 2015 
deficit equivalent to 1.6 per cent of GDP. This compares to an underlying deficit 
excluding bank bailouts of 11.2 per cent in 2009. 
 
With the economy expected to continue to show strong growth, employment 
increasing and personal consumption growing it is likely that tax revenue will 
increase again in 2016 and 2017. We also maintain our assumption that much of the 
improvement in corporation tax witnessed in 2015 will remain in place. Thus, total 
receipts are forecast to be over €68 billion in 2016 and close to €71 billion in 2017. 
 
External discipline imposed by EU budgetary rules means our expectation is that 
growth in government expenditure will be close to target. The improving labour 
market will also reduce pressure on transfer payments and we anticipate that the 
cost of servicing the national debt will be lower than provided for, as is usually the 
case. If our assumptions prove to be correct, total expenditure will be €70.8 billion in 
2016 and €71.3 billion in 2017. 
 
On the basis of these forecasts the general government deficit should improve to 
€2.5 billion in 2016, equivalent to 1.1 per cent of GDP. If the economy continues to 
perform as forecast this improvement should continue through 2017 with the deficit 
reducing to approximately €400 million or just 0.2 per cent of GDP. 
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General Assessment 
As we move into the first quarter of 2016 most of the available economic 
information suggests that the Irish economy continues to exhibit robust and 
significant growth. Tax returns for the first quarter of the year remain strong while 
recent labour market information indicates that the unemployment rate continues to 
fall and the rate of job creation continues apace. On foot of a significant increase in 
expenditure in 2015, consumer sentiment continues to remain positive into the new 
year. Therefore, we believe GDP will grow by 4.8 per cent in 2016 with GNP growing 
by 5.0 per cent. 
 
One significant downside risk for the Irish economy in 2016 is via international trade. 
Globally, distress in financial markets has been a feature of the first quarter with 
many stock markets registering substantial declines in value. This in part reflects the 
weaknesses of many emerging economies. As noted in the Winter Commentary, 
from a trade perspective, the outlook for the Chinese economy is particularly 
worrisome; China has after all been the major source of demand for many 
commodities in the recent global recovery. The problems of the Chinese economy 
are not amenable to any quick technocratic fixes. The economy is extremely 
unbalanced, with very high savings rates and large levels of debt. As the year 
progresses the implications of continued uncertainty for the global trade outlook 
along with the results of the forthcoming UK referendum on Brexit will be of 
considerable interest. In light of the global uncertainty we have modified downwards 
slightly our forecast for exports of Irish goods and services. Nonetheless, the most 
recent set of high frequency data do indicate that the outlook for traded Irish goods 
and services remains very positive. 
 
The volatility observed in international conditions reinforces the vulnerability of the 
Irish economy to exogenous shocks which potentially could yield adverse outcomes 
for, amongst other key variables, the public finances. This has potential implications 
for fiscal policy over the medium term; one of the key lessons to be learned from the 
downturn experienced in the Irish fiscal accounts post-2008 was that any diminution 
in the taxation base needs to be undertaken with extreme care. In the short- to 
medium term, this suggests that any buoyancy in taxation revenues currently being 
experienced would be more prudently employed through a combination of 
investment in public infrastructure and/or reductions in the national debt rather 
than through significant cuts in personal taxation rates. It is also worth remembering 
the exceptionally low yields on Irish Government bonds, indicating that the cost of 
servicing the national debt continues to be very low given the still significant size of 
the debt. Any shock to international bond yields could very quickly increase the cost 
of servicing the debt.  
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We also release our first forecast for growth for 2017. In the previous Commentary 
we estimated the rate of potential output growth for the Irish economy as well as an 
estimate of the output gap. Given the strong growth anticipated for 2016, our belief 
is that the output gap will all but close in the present year. This would suggest that 
growth in the economy will converge back to potential output growth rates in 2017. 
However, we feel that the pace of growth in the economy at present is such that 
output growth in 2017 will exceed the potential rate by approximately 0.5 per cent 
resulting in an expected increase in output of 4 per cent in 2017. 
 
In the International Section of the Commentary we focus somewhat on inward 
migration in the Euro Area. Importantly we draw on earlier research by McQuinn and 
Whelan (2015)17 in contextualising the issue. Demographic forecasts for the Euro 
Area compiled by EuroStat and presented in McQuinn and Whelan (2015) clearly 
demonstrate that Europe has an ageing population and crucially that this issue is 
impacting on the growth prospects for the different Member States right now. This is 
because the proportion of the population in the key working age category of 15 to 64 
has already peaked across Europe and is set to decline quite dramatically over the 
next generation. Therefore, in the absence of significant net inward migration, future 
European labour supply is likely to contract with negative implications for economic 
growth and living standards. It is also clear from the figures presented in the 
international section that this trend is common across all Member States (including 
Ireland) of the Euro Area. 
 
The issue of housing supply is considered from a regional perspective in Morgenroth 
(2016). This Research Note provides an analysis of housing supply and prices at 
county level. It focuses on the more recent period, but some analysis is also carried 
out over a longer period. Particular attention is paid in the Note to trends in housing 
pressures in the greater Dublin, Cork and Galway regions. The Note identifies that the 
dispersion of house prices across Irish counties is now as great as it was during the 
height of the boom and that the lack of a supply response is particularly evident in 
the Greater Dublin region. The Note concludes by offering a number of potential 
reasons for the lack of supply; despite the recent price rises in the Dublin market it 
may still not be profitable for developers, there may be a lack of suitable 
development land available or developers may be hoarding land for future 
development given the likely higher price and therefore profit that will be available in 
the future. Finally, developers might also be facing financing constraints. Some 
econometric results are presented which support the latter view. 
 
 
                                                          
17  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan (2015). ‘Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms’, ESRI 
Working paper No. 501. Available at www.esri.ie/pubs/WP501.pdf. 
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In another assessment of housing supply, Barrett and Kelly (2016) in a Special Article 
to the present Commentary provide an initial exploration of housing tenure and 
movement among Ireland’s older population using The Irish Longitudinal Study on 
Ageing (TILDA). TILDA contains data on a large-scale representative sample of 
Ireland’s older people. As the data are compiled from a panel study, whereby the 
same people are interviewed at different points in time, Barrett and Kelly (2016) are 
able to look at the nature of housing among the older population and also their 
propensity to move. They find no evidence of trading down among the group.  
 
Developments on the supply side of the Irish housing market have a number of 
important policy implications. For example, the Central Bank of Ireland has signalled 
that there will be a review of the macro-prudential policy measures in November of 
this year. These measures, which were aimed at curbing house price inflation, were 
introduced in February 2015 after a consultative process. The review exercise will be 
an important opportunity to modify the implementation of this crucially important 
policy tool. In Duffy and McQuinn (2015)18 we argued that macro-prudential policy 
should be implemented on the basis of counter-cyclical policy rules. These rules 
would be triggered on the basis of a certain set of indicators focussing on house 
prices, supply levels and developments in mortgage credit. In recommending this, we 
feel we were advocating the adoption of international best practice where influential 
contributors such as Bank of England (2009),19 Haldane (2010),20 Galati and 
Moessner (2013)21 and Goodhart (2011)22 have all broadly recommended such a 
course of action. The mere signal of a rule change can itself have a significant impact 
on market activity, although naturally rules in the monetary policy space23 have been 
demonstrated to provide greater clarity and transparency to different market 
participants if consistently applied. Furthermore, analysis in the previous 
Commentary24 demonstrates why it is important that housing market activity should 
have a significant weight in any decision rules. If housing supply reaches the level of 
structural demand in 2018, macro-prudential policy could then play an important 
role in ensuring we do not experience the spiralling levels of supply evidenced in the 
Irish market in the early part of the 2000s. It is, after all, the combination of 
overvalued house prices and large volumes of housing supply which poses a systemic 
financial stability concern. 
 
                                                          
18  Duffy, D. and K. McQuinn (2014). ‘Assessment of Proposed Macro-Prudential Policy Measures’, Appendix, Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, Winter, 2014, ESRI. 
19  Bank of England (2009). The role of Macro-prudential policy, a discussion paper, November. 
20  Haldane A. (2010). ‘Curbing the credit cycle’, Speech at the Columbia University Center on Capitalism and Society Annual 
Conference, New York, November. 
21  Galati, G. and M. Richhild (2013). ‘Macro-prudential Policy – A Literature Review,’ Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley 
Blackwell, Vol. 27(5), pages 846-878, December. 
22  Goodhart C. (2011). ‘The Macroprudential authority: Powers, scope and accountability’, OECD Journal: Financial Market 
Trends Vol. 2011 – Issue 2. 
23  See Kydland F. and E. C. Prescott (1977). ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans’. Journal of 
Political Economy: 473–492  
24  This analysis indicates that actual housing supply is only likely to meet the long-run structural demand level of 25,000 
units in 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detailed Forecast Tables 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A1 Exports of Goods and Services 
 
2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 113.3 27.0 14.8 143.8 12.8 8.5 162.3 9.4 6.7 177.5 
Tourism 3.7 18.2 6.0 4.3 4.2 3.2 4.5 4.2 3.2 4.7 
Other Services 98.1 16.8 11.2 112.5 12.4 10.5 126.5 8.9 6.8 137.8 
Exports Of Goods and Services 215.0 21.2 13.8 260.6 12.5 9.3 293.2 9.1 6.7 319.9 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0 
  
0.0   0.0 
Adjusted Exports 215.0 21.2 13.8 260.6 12.5 9.3 293.2 9.1 6.7 319.9 
 
 
 
Forecast Table A2 Investment 
 
2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 3.8 13.1 7.3 4.3 21.6 16.6 5.2 38.2 35.6 7.2 
Other Building 8.0 15.6 11.0 9.2 15.4 10.4 10.6 13.9 8.9 12.1 
Transfer Costs 0.7 -2.5 1.6 0.7 26.0 20.0 0.9 20.8 15.0 1.1 
Building and Construction 12.5 13.8 9.4 14.2 17.8 12.7 16.8 21.9 17.4 20.4 
Machinery and Equipment 24.0 37.6 37.4 33.0 29.3 26.3 42.7 26.9 23.7 54.2 
Total Investment 36.5 29.4 28.2 47.2 25.9 22.5 59.5 25.4 22.1 74.6 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A3 Personal Income 
 
2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc 3.4 1.0 0.0 3.4 2.5 0.1 3.5 3.5 0.1 3.6 
Non-Agricultural Wages 70.0 4.8 3.3 73.4 4.5 3.3 76.7 4.2 3.2 79.9 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 19.5 30.3 5.9 25.3 15.0 3.8 29.1 12.8 3.7 32.9 
Total Income Received 92.9 10.0 9.3 102.1 7.0 7.2 109.3 6.5 7.1 116.4 
Current Transfers 23.7 0.0 0.0 23.7 -1.0 -0.2 23.5 2.4 0.6 24.0 
Gross Personal Income 116.6 7.9 9.3 125.8 5.5 7.0 132.8 5.8 7.7 140.4 
Direct Personal Taxes 27.3 6.0 1.6 28.9 3.9 1.1 30.1 3.7 1.1 31.2 
Personal Disposable Income 89.3 8.5 7.6 96.9 6.0 5.8 102.7 6.4 6.5 109.3 
Consumption 89.0 3.8 3.4 92.4 4.8 4.5 96.9 4.5 4.4 101.2 
Personal Savings 0.3 1301.9 4.2 4.5 30.3 1.4 5.9 36.6 2.1 8.0 
Savings Ratio 0.4 
  
4.6 
  
5.7   7.3 
Average Personal Tax Rate 23.3 
  
22.9 
  
22.5   22.1 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 Imports of Goods and Services  
 
2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 % change in 2017 2017 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 70.9 11.7 8.4 79.2 9.9 7.2 87.0 9.2 7.0 95.0 
Tourism 4.6 7.1 2.0 4.9 4.9 1.8 5.1 4.3 2.8 5.3 
Other Services 104.8 26.1 22.0 131.7 19.5 16.0 157.4 15.4 13.0 181.6 
Imports of Goods and Services 180.3 19.7 0.0 215.8 15.6 0.0 249.6 13.0 0.0 282.0 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
-0.1 
  
-0.1   -0.2 
Adjusted Imports 180.3 19.6 16.3 215.7 15.6 12.5 249.4 13.0 10.7 281.9 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 Balance of Payments 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 215.0 260.6 293.2 319.9 
Imports of Goods and Services 180.3 215.8 249.6 282.0 
Net Factor Payments -26.2 -31.7 -33.0 -34.2 
Net Transfers -2.7 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 
Balance on Current Account 5.9 10.4 8.0 1.0 
As a % of GNP 3.6 5.7 4.1 0.5 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 Employment and Unemployment, Annual Average 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 
 
000’s 000’s 000’s 000’s 
Agriculture 109.0 109.9 107.5 107.5 
Industry 348.4 373.7 379.5 387.0 
Of which: Construction 109.4 125.5 129.5 136.0 
Services 1,453.3 1,474.1 1,514.8 1,543.8 
Total at Work 1,913.8 1,963.5 2,001.8 2,038.3 
Unemployed 242.8 203.6 189.8 170.7 
Labour Force 2,156.8 2,167.2 2,191.7 2,208.9 
Unemployment Rate, % 11.3 9.5 8.7 7.7 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
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Nowcasting Appendix 
 
In the past 12 months we have provided quarterly updates for current estimates 
of GDP based on the Nowcasting1 model. Table 1 shows the Nowcast and forecast 
of GDP for the first two quarters of 2016.  
 
TABLE 1  Current Backcast, Nowcast and Forecast of Irish Quarter-on-Quarter GDP Growth Rates 
 
Period Nature of Estimate GDP Estimate % 95% Confidence Interval 
Q4 2015 Backcast 2.71   
Q1 2016 Nowcast 1.47 0 2.93 
Q2 2016 Forecast 1.48 0.1 2.86 
Source:  Own estimates. 
 
Throughout 2015, the Nowcasting methodology consistently suggested a growth 
rate of around 6.8 per cent per annum for GDP. Preliminary Quarterly National 
Accounts (QNA) for Quarter 4, 2015 released in mid-March indicate that GDP 
growth in the Irish economy could now be as high as 7.8 per cent for 2015. The 
Nowcast estimate provided in Table 1 suggests that growth will continue to be 
strong in the first half of 2016. 
 
Given the variances being observed in Irish economic performance over the past 
period of time, having an approach which provides a timely and accurate 
assessment of the underlying state of the economy is of particular benefit in 
generating the overall forecast of the economy in the Commentary. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1  A detailed discussion of the Nowcasting model can be found in Byrne, D., K. McQuinn and C. Morley (2014). 
‘Nowcasting and the Need for Timely Estimates of Movements in Irish Output, Research Note, 2014/3/1, Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, Autumn 2014, The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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Housing and Ireland’s Older Population 
Alan Barrett and Elish Kelly* 
Abstract  
It is sometimes argued that residential immobility on the part of older people 
results in the sub-optimal allocation of the housing stock. If older people remain 
in larger houses which were purchased with a view to housing families with 
growing children, then such houses are not available for the next generation of 
younger families. Similarly, if older people remain close to places of work after 
retirement, they may contribute to the limiting of supply in urban centres. In this 
paper, we explore this issue in two ways. First, we look at the types of houses 
being occupied by older people in different household structures – living alone, as 
couples or with children/grandchildren. This provides a sense of whether there 
are, in fact, many older people living in houses that are large relative to their 
needs. Second, we explore whether there is much evidence of older people 
‘trading down’ to smaller houses or ‘trading out’ of urban areas to more rural 
areas. On the first issue, the picture is mixed. We find that many older people 
living alone already live in smaller houses. For example, 40.6 per cent of older 
people living alone live in houses with four rooms or less – the corresponding 
figure for people living with children/grandchildren is 15.8 per cent. However, 
when we look at couples, we find that 30.9 per cent live in houses with seven 
rooms or more. We find no evidence of trading down or trading out among the 
small proportion of older people who moved between 2010 and 2012. The 
findings suggest that there is scope for generating more mobility in housing but 
any policy initiatives should be sensitive to concerns related to social isolation 
and negative health consequences if older people leave familiar communities. 
 
1. Introduction 
Ireland is currently facing a shortage of residential accommodation as evidenced, 
for example, by rising rents and low levels of new completions relative to 
estimates of demand. In this context, it has been argued that a lack of housing 
mobility among Ireland’s older population contributes to the overall difficulties 
(see for example Lyons, 2016). There are at least two dimensions to this 
argument. First, older people can find themselves living in houses which are large 
relative to their needs once children have grown up and left the family home – 
so-called ‘empty nesters’. If they downsized, they would free up supply of larger 
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family homes. Second, it could also be the case that retired people stay living in 
urban centres which were once close to places of work even though they no 
longer need such proximity. In this case, if they moved out of urban areas they 
would free up accommodation better suited to those still in work. 
 
While these arguments are often made it is not clear, for example, whether there 
are lots of empty nesters or whether trading down is infrequent. If it is the case 
that significant numbers of older people actually live in smaller homes or that 
significant numbers already move at later stages of their lives, then there will be 
limited scope for increasing movement in the housing market through any actions 
aimed at incentivising more mobility for older people. 
 
The lack of information on these questions is not just an Irish phenomenon. 
Banks et al. (2010) note that ‘even the basic question of whether housing is 
downsized as people age is not well answered in the literature’ (Banks et al., 
2010, p.347). They point to contradictory findings on downsizing. Venti and Wise 
(2001) find that the elderly do not generally reduce housing equity as they age in 
the United States, but Sheiner and Weil (1992) did find widespread switches out 
of home ownership. In their own work, Banks et al. (2010) suggest that some of 
the confusion may arise from the different lengths of time over which possible 
transitions are viewed. For example, they show that over a two-year period, only 
11 per cent of older home owners in the US move but the proportion increases to 
more than 30 per cent in a ten-year period. Banks et al. (2010) also show that 
rates of movement are lower in the UK compared to the US. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an initial exploration of housing tenure 
and movement among Ireland’s older population using a rich data source – The 
Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing (TILDA). We provide more details on the data 
below but for now we will note that TILDA contains data on a large-scale 
representative sample of Ireland’s older people. TILDA is also a panel study 
whereby the same people are interviewed at different points in time. This allows 
us to look at the nature of housing among the older population and also their 
propensity to move.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the remainder of this section, we provide 
more detail on the data. In Section 2, we look at housing characteristics among 
the older population with an emphasis on exploring whether there is evidence of 
older people living in larger dwellings. In Section 3, we look at moves among 
older people. Here we are particularly interested in whether there is evidence of 
people downsizing or moving from urban to rural areas. In this section of the 
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paper, we also assess econometrically the characteristics associated with 
whether or not older people move accommodation. We conclude in Section 4. 
 
TILDA is a nationally representative study of the population of Ireland aged 50 
and above who were living in the community when first surveyed.1 The first wave 
of data was collected between October 2009 and July 2011. In total, 6,279 
households participated in this survey,2 with information on a total of 8,504 
individuals collected. Of this, 8,175 individuals were aged 50 and over, while the 
remaining 326 people interviewed were the younger spouses/partners of the 
other survey participants.  
 
In the report, we begin by examining the household structure among the over 50s 
in Ireland using the first wave of the TILDA data (2009-2011). For this 
examination, the household3 is used as the unit of analysis. In particular, the 
results are based on the responses to the House Ownership module that were 
provided by the person who was designated as the ‘financial respondent’ when 
the interview was conducted.4 Thus, the analysis is based on 5,959 observations,5 
with all results weighted to ensure that the findings are representative of the full 
population of people aged 50 and above in Ireland at the time the first wave of 
data were collected.   
 
In the second part of the report, we examine the characteristics of those 
individuals who moved accommodation between TILDA Waves 1 and 2. The 
second wave of the TILDA data was collected between February 2012 and March 
2013. In particular, we present the Wave 1 characteristics of those individuals 
who moved accommodation between 2009-2011 and 2012-2013.  
 
 
                                                          
1  Individuals living in long-term care institutions were not included in the sampling frame for the Wave 1 TILDA data 
capture. However, individuals living in such institutions are captured in subsequent waves of the TILDA data (as 
people who lived in houses, apartments, etc., when the Wave 1 data was captured have moved into long-term care 
institutions when subsequent waves of the data are captured). 
2  The number of selected eligible households was 10,128; thus, the response rate was 62 per cent.  
3  As opposed to the individual. 
4  In capturing the TILDA data, when two persons were married together in a household, or were living together as if 
married, one individual was designated as the financial respondent in order to reduce respondent burden in 
capturing the data, and also to ensure more accurate responses for those TILDA modules that the financial 
respondent had to provide information for. In addition to the ‘House Ownership’ module, the financial respondent 
also answered the ‘Other Assets’ module.  
5  76 households which contained two financial respondents were excluded from the analysis as the housing data 
provided by each respondent were not consistent. 
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2. Household Structure among the Over 50s 
In Table 2.1, we begin our exploration of the housing characteristics of the over 
50s and show the distribution of household composition for the full sample and 
by age. As noted above, our tables in this section are based on households, as 
opposed to individuals, and the age of the household is determined by the 
financial respondent in that household. The data presented relate to responses to 
the survey in its first wave, conducted between 2009 and 2011. 
 
Across the full sample, households are divided in three, almost equal, categories; 
living alone, living with a spouse only and living with children6 or grandchildren. 
However, the distribution is quite different across the age categories and reflects 
expected situations over the life-span. While just under 20 per cent of households 
aged 50 to 59 are made up of people living alone, the corresponding figure for 
the over 80s is 63 per cent. Similarly, the proportion of people living only with a 
spouse peaks in the age group 60 to 69, while the proportion living with children 
and grandchildren declines between the 50s and the late 70s. 
 
TABLE 2.1 Household Structure of Individuals Aged 50 and Above in Ireland: 2009-2011 
 All 50-59 60-69 70-79 80 Plus 
Living alone 31.1 19.7 26.4 43.8 63.0 
Living with spouse only 32.4 23.0 44.2 39.2 19.4 
Living with child/grandchildren 33.7 53.2 27.0 15.1 16.5 
Living with other relative 2.4 3.3 2.0 1.9 1.0 
Living with unrelated people 0.5 0.8 0.4 - 0.2 
Total: 100 100 100 100 100 
      
Population:1 875,632 341,829 262,273 184,569 86,962 
 
Source:  TILDA Wave 1 Data. 
Note:  1  The population figures (based on the 2010 QNHS) were derived by applying the CAPI (computer aided personal interview) 
weight that is in the TILDA data to the sample used in the analysis. 
 
In Table 2.2, we look more closely at the distribution of household composition 
and provide breakdowns by age and gender. We identified in Table 2.1 that 
almost two-thirds of those aged over 80 were living alone (63 per cent) – from 
Table 2.2 we can see that over 70 per cent of these households are female. Apart 
from the age group 50 to 59, Table 2.2 shows how the living alone households are 
more likely to be female. 
 
 
                                                          
6  Including step and adopted children. 
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TABLE 2.2 Gender Profile of Individuals Aged 50 and Above in Different Household Structures: 2009-2011 
 Living alone Living with 
spouse only 
Living with children 
/ grandchildren 
Living with 
others1 
Gender Profile of People:      
All:     
Male 42.7 54.7 46.9 53.8 
Female 57.4 45.3 53.1 46.2 
Aged 50-59:     
Male 59.8 46.6 48.2 55.6 
Female 40.2 53.4 51.8 44.4 
Aged 60-69:     
Male 44.5 56.5 51.6 54.5 
Female 55.6 43.5 48.4 45.5 
Aged 70-79:     
Male 35.9 58.1 36.5 56.4 
Female 64.2 41.9 63.5 43.6 
Aged 80 and Above:     
Male 29.3 66.0 26.6 13.7 
Female 70.7 34.0 73.4 86.3 
 
Source:  TILDA Wave 1 Data. 
Note:  1  Relative or non-relative. 
 
In Table 2.3 we look at the family structures of the differing household 
compositions. One point that emerges from Table 2.3 is that almost 40 per cent 
of people who are living alone have no living children (38.2 per cent). This is 
noteworthy because it suggests that many of those living alone are not ‘empty 
nesters’ – it seems that they never had children and this may be reflected in their 
house sizes. Among couples, 12.3 per cent have no children meaning that almost 
90 per cent do have children and so are ‘empty nesters’, in the sense of having 
had children who have now left the family home. 
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TABLE 2.3 Family Information for Individuals aged 50 and Above by Household Structure: 2009-2011 
 Living alone Living with 
spouse only 
Living with children / 
grandchildren 
Living with 
others1 
Number of (Living) Children:     
0 38.2 12.3 - 43.0 
1 7.7 6.7 7.0 6.4 
2 12.8 22.2 23.1 14.6 
3 14.1 24.5 24.8 12.3 
4 10.9 17.3 19.7 12.8 
5 6.6 8.2 11.8 4.3 
6 and Above 9.8 8.8 13.7 6.7 
     
Proximity of Children of People:2     
Co-resident children - - 99.4 25.2 
At least one child in the county 48.8 68.2 0.6 21.7 
Child lives in another county 8.1 13.6 0.1 5.5 
Child lives in another country 4.9 5.9 - 4.7 
No children 38.2 12.3 - 43.0 
 
Source:  TILDA Wave 1 Data. 
Note:  1 Relative or non-relative. 
2 This question is asked of all children aged 16 and above, so the categories are not mutually exclusive. 
 
Table 2.4 tries to provide a sense of housing size by household composition, with 
a view to exploring one of our key questions; if there is evidence of many older 
people living in houses which are large relative to their needs? We will focus first 
on the living alone group. From the top panel of the table, we can see that the 
living alone households are more heavily concentrated in dwellings that are likely 
to be smaller – for example 6.7 per cent of those living alone are in apartments/ 
flats/bedsits compared to just 0.5 per cent of people living with children and/or 
grandchildren. Similarly, 21.8 per cent of the living alone households are in 
terraced houses, compared to 17.5 per cent of people living with children and/or 
grandchildren. Having said that, we can also see that almost half of those living 
alone reside in detached houses so the picture is somewhat mixed. If we look at 
couples, we see that 60.2 per cent live in detached houses and so they are more 
likely to live in such houses compared to people living with children and/or 
grandchildren.7 
 
 
                                                          
7  In Appendix 1, we provide the information in the top panel of Table 2.4 by area; Dublin, other urban and rural. 
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If we consider this issue from the perspective of number of rooms,8 we again can 
see that living alone households tend to live in smaller dwellings. Of the living 
alone group, 40.6 per cent live in households with four rooms or less – for people 
living with children and/or grandchildren, the corresponding figure is 15.8 per 
cent. Looking at larger houses, we can see that 36.4 per cent of people living with 
children and/or grandchildren live in houses with seven or more rooms. The 
corresponding figures for the living alone and couples are 13.9 per cent and 30.9 
per cent respectively. Hence, while these data show that, compared to larger 
households, there are smaller proportions of those living alone and couples living 
in larger houses; they also show that a reasonable proportion of couples in 
particular reside in large houses.  
 
TABLE 2.4 Housing Information for Individuals aged 50 and Above by Household Structure: 2009-2011 
 Living 
alone 
Living with 
spouse only 
Living with 
children / 
grandchildren 
Living with 
other 
relatives 
Living with non-
relatives 
      
Type of Residence:      
Detached house 47.9 60.2 56.5 65.5 45.4 
Semi-detached house 23.2 23.6 25.3 16.9 21.8 
Terraced house 21.8 14.8 17.5 16.6 23.6 
Apartment/flat/bedsit 6.7 1.2 0.5 1.0 9.3 
Other  0.5 0.2 0.1 - - 
      
Number of Rooms:      
1 1.6 - - - - 
2 6.7 0.7 0.3 0.8 - 
3 13.9 7.1 4.5 4.6 6.8 
4 18.4 11.8 11.0 19.0 6.8 
5 26.5 25.0 24.1 20.9 24.7 
6 19.0 24.0 23.4 23.6 27.5 
7 8.7 16.4 15.8 16.2 13.1 
8 and above 5.2 14.5 20.6 14.9 21.0 
Non-response 0.1 0.5 0.3 - - 
 
Source:  TILDA Wave 1 Data. 
 
 
                                                          
8  A room is defined as a space of a housing unit of at least 4 square metres (e.g., normal bedrooms, dining rooms, living 
rooms and habitable cellars and attics) with a height over 2 metres and accessible from inside the unit. Kitchens are 
not counted unless the cooking facilities are in a room used for other purposes. Thus, a kitchen-cum-dining room is 
one room in the count of rooms. The following do not count as rooms: bathrooms, toilets, corridors, utility rooms and 
lobbies. Verandas, lounges and conservatories only count as rooms if they are used all year round. A room used solely 
for business use is excluded, but is included if it is shared between private and business use. If the dwelling is shared 
by more than one household all rooms are counted for the owner/tenant except those exclusively used by the other 
households. 
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Summarising so far, our task has been to see if there is evidence of older people 
occupying ‘excess housing’ in the sense of there being a lot of older households 
living in houses that exceed their current needs. Focusing on the living alone 
group first, the data appear to show that many in this group are already living in 
smaller dwellings – 40.6 per cent live in houses with four rooms or fewer. 
However, almost 14 per cent live in houses with seven or more rooms so the 
evidence is mixed. For couples, over 30 per cent live in houses with seven or 
more rooms. While this is lower than the corresponding figure for people living 
with children and/or grandchildren, it is still sizeable. 
 
In the remaining tables in this section, we go on to consider some additional 
issues which are not central to the current research questions, but are 
nonetheless of interest. In Table 2.5 we look at ownership type. One striking 
point from this table is the higher proportion of renters in the living alone 
category. While 15.9 per cent of living alone households are renters, only 4.7 per 
cent of couples are renting. As with the earlier tables, this points to distinctive 
characteristics among some of the living alone group. 
 
TABLE 2.5 Ownership Type for Individuals aged 50 and above by Household Structure: 2009-2011 
 Living 
alone 
Living with 
spouse only 
Living with 
children / 
grandchildren 
Living with 
other 
relatives 
Living with 
non-relatives 
Ownership Type:      
Owned by the respondent or 
his/her spouse 78.3 94.3 87.5 67.6 58.2 
Owned by another 
household member1 3.1 0.6 2.8 26.5 4.4 
Rented 15.9 4.7 9.3 6.0 37.5 
Occupied rent free2  2.5 0.5 0.3 - - 
Don't know 0.0 0.1 - - - 
Non-response 0.2 - 0.1 - - 
 
Source:  TILDA Wave 1 Data. 
Note:  1 Not the respondent's spouse/partner. 
2 Not owned by a household member. 
 
In Table 2.6, we draw on a question that was contained in the TILDA survey which 
sought to establish if people were in receipt of rental income from their primary 
residence. As can be seen from Table 2.6, this is rarely observed. The one 
exception is households in which people are living with non-relatives, where 
almost 5 per cent are in receipt of rental income. 
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TABLE 2.6 Rental Income for Individuals aged 50 and above by Household Structure: 2009-2011 
Received Rent for 
Property in Last Year: 
Living alone Living with 
spouse only 
Living with 
children / 
grandchildren 
Living with 
other 
relatives 
Living with 
non-relatives 
Yes 0.5 0.5 0.2 - 4.6 
No 77.8 93.7 87.3 67.6 53.5 
Not Applicable 21.7 5.8 12.5 32.4 41.8 
 
Source:  TILDA Wave 1 Data. 
 
3. Movers among the Over 50s 
In this section, the particular richness of the TILDA data emerges because we are 
able to draw on the fact that participants were interviewed in 2009/2011 and 
then re-interviewed in 2012. This means that we are able to identify who moved 
between the two waves of the survey. We can then go on to look at the extent to 
which people moved and the characteristics of movers. We are particularly 
interested in seeing if there is evidence of trading down (to smaller dwellings) or 
trading out (from urban to rural). As indicated in Section 1, the analysis in this 
part of the paper is based on individuals (as opposed to households). 
 
Before presenting the tables, we should mention that we can identify which 
people moved between private dwellings and who moved into nursing homes 
and other institutions.9 As only a tiny proportion moved into nursing homes (0.4 
per cent), the sample size is small and we are unable to say much about this 
group which would be statistically reliable. 
 
Turning now to Table 3.1, we can see that in total 3.1 per cent of TILDA 
respondents moved between Waves 1 and 2; 2.7 per cent between private 
dwellings and, as just mentioned, 0.4 per cent into institutional settings.10 As the 
period in question was one of great uncertainty in the Irish housing market, 
moving in general was at a lower rate than would generally be the case. This 
means that it is difficult to say if the rate of movement observed in the TILDA 
data is low due to the period effect or due to rates of movement always being 
low for older people in Ireland. Nevertheless, we can at least look within the data 
and look at the rates of movement across different age groups within TILDA. This 
is done in Table 3.2. Looking across ‘all movers’ (private and institutional) and 
 
                                                          
9  Individuals who moved abroad, who died or who dropped out of the survey are not captured in the TILDA data.  
10  Banks et al. (2010) report 11 per cent of older home owners in the US moving in a two-year period and almost 40 per 
cent of renters. Hence, the figure here of 3.1 per cent is tiny. 
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private movers only, we see that rates of movement are highest for the youngest 
(50-59) and the oldest (80+). 
 
TABLE 3.1 Percentage of Individuals Who Moved Between 2009-2011 and 2012-2013  
Moved  
No 96.9 
Yes- Private Household (HH) 2.7 
Yes - Nursing Home/Other Institution 0.4 
Population:1 1,015,705 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
Note:  1 The population figure was derived by applying the CAPI weight that is in the TILDA data to the sample used in the analysis 
(see Note under Table 2.1). Those missing age information were excluded from the analysis.   
 
TABLE 3.2 Movers by Age Category 
 All Movers Private Movers 
Age:   
50-59 3.4 3.3 
60-69 2.1 1.9 
70-79 3.1 2.0 
80 and Above 5.7 3.9 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
 
In Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, we provide information on the baseline characteristics 
of movers and non-movers with a view to getting a sense of what distinguishes 
movers. Some points emerge. First, and reflecting Table 3.2, movers are more 
likely to be older – while 7.5 per cent of non-movers are over 80, this rises to 14.1 
per cent for movers. As can be seen from the difference in the proportions of all 
movers and private movers among the 80+s, some of the people in question are 
moving into institutional settings.  
 
Separated/divorced people and widows are more likely to move, as are people 
who were born outside of Ireland. In Table 3.4, we can see that those living alone 
are more likely to move compared with others. In Table 3.5, we can see that 
people with no children are more likely to move whereas people with co-resident 
children are less likely to move. 
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TABLE 3.3 Demographic Profile of Non-Movers and Movers - I 
 Non-Movers All Movers Private HH  Movers1 
Gender:    
Male 48.0 51.5 52.7 
Female 52.0 48.5 47.3 
Age:    
50-59 41.5 45.8 52.1 
60-69 31.9 20.9 22.4 
70-79 19.2 19.3 14.3 
80 and Above 7.5 14.1 11.2 
Marital Status:    
Married 69.6 48.0 50.9 
Never Married 9.5 10.2 8.5 
Separated/Divorced 6.4 18.7 21.4 
Widowed 14.5 23.1 19.3 
Irish Born:    
Yes 91.8 83.0 81.7 
No 8.2 17.0 18.3 
Health:    
Excellent 15.0 15.9 18.1 
Very Good 28.9 22.2 20.5 
Good 32.6 32.0 33.2 
Fair 18.5 23.1 21.7 
Poor  5.0 6.8 6.5 
    
Population: 984,293 31,412 26,935 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
Note:  1 Private HH Movers are a sub-set of the ‘All Movers’ category. 
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TABLE 3.4 Demographic Profile of Non-Movers and Movers - II 
 Non-Movers All Movers Private HH  Movers 
Education:    
Primary or Less 35.7 41.4 36.0 
Junior Certificate 25.7 23.7 25.7 
Leaving Certificate 18.8 17.5 20.5 
Certificate/Diploma 10.1 6.4 6.4 
Degree or Higher 9.6 11.0 11.5 
    
Employment Status:    
Employed 37.2 26.8 29.3 
Retired 34.3 38.7 34.8 
Other 28.5 34.6 35.9 
    
Household Composition:    
Lives Alone 21.5 40.5 37.2 
Lives with Spouse 38.7 27.0 28.1 
Lives with Child 36.0 26.7 28.8 
Other 3.8 5.8 5.9 
Population: 984,293 31,412 26,935 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
 
TABLE 3.5 Family Information of Non-Movers and Movers 
 Non-Movers All Movers Private HH  Movers 
Living Children:    
0 14.7 20.4 18.8 
1 6.7 9.1 8.4 
2 20.4 14.1 14.2 
3 21.7 19.8 21.2 
4 17.2 17.1 16.5 
5 9.0 7.6 8.8 
6 and Above 10.3 11.9 12.2 
    
Proximity of Children    
No Children 14.7 20.4 18.8 
Co-Resident 37.0 26.7 28.8 
One Child lives in County 37.5 36.6 36.3 
Child lives in other County 7.6 8.5 8.5 
Child lives in other Country 3.2 7.8 7.6 
Population: 984,293 31,412 26,935 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
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When we econometrically examined the characteristics associated with mobility 
among older people (Table 3.6), the results confirmed many of the previous 
descriptives. Specifically, we found that those aged 50-59 and aged 80 and above 
were more likely to move accommodation between 2009/2011 and 2012 
compared to those aged 60-69.  
 
TABLE 3.6 Determinants of Housing Mobility Among Older People (Marginal Effects) 
 All Movers Private Movers 
Gender (Ref: Females)   
Male  0.006 0.006 
Age (Ref: Aged 60-69) (0.004) (0.004) 
50-59 0.018*** 0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
70-79 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
80  and Above 0.023** 0.012 
 (0.012) (0.010) 
Marital Status (Ref: Single)   
Married 0.005 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Separated/Divorced 0.067*** 0.076*** 
 (0.024) (0.027) 
Widowed 0.032** 0.034** 
 (0.017) (0.018) 
Educational Attainment (Ref: Primary or Less)  
Junior Certificate -0.004 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Leaving Certificate -0.005 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Cert/Diploma -0.013** -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Degree 0.002 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Post-Graduate Degree -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
  Contd. 
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TABLE 3.6 Contd. 
 All Movers Private Movers 
Economic Status (Ref: Employed)   
Retired 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Unemployed 0.019** 0.020** 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Sick/Disabled 0.022** 0.026** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Home Duties 0.005 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Education/Training 0.123*** 0.117*** 
 (0.059) (0.056) 
Other 0.049** 0.041** 
Health Status (Ref: Excellent)   
Very Good -0.011* -0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Good -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Fair -0.004 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Poor -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.006) 
Birth Location (Ref: Non-Irish)   
Irish -0.024*** -0.022*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) 
Proximity of Children (Ref: No Children)   
Co-Resident -0.018*** -0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
One Child Lives in County  -0.013** -0.010* 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Child Lives in Other County  -0.009 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Child Lives in Other Country 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.008) 
   
Observations 6,981 6,953 
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.076 
 
Source:  Authors’ analysis. 
Note:  Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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When we focused specifically on private moves, only those aged 50-59 were 
more likely to make private accommodation moves. The results also indicated 
that older people who were either separated/divorced or widowed were more 
likely to move relative to single people.  
 
Regarding the impact of a person’s economic status on mobility, those who were 
retired, unemployed, sick/disabled or pursuing an education/training course were 
more likely to move accommodation between 2009/2011 and 2012 compared to 
those in employment. A person’s self-perceived health status was found to have 
no impact on their decision to move accommodation.11 People born in Ireland 
were found to be less likely to move accommodation between 2009/2011 and 
2012, as were older people who were co-residing with their children or had at 
least one child living in the same county.  
 
Our next task is to explore the issues of trading down and trading out and we 
begin this in Table 3.7a. At this point we are excluding people who moved into 
institutional settings and we are only looking at moves between private 
dwellings. This means that our sample is now the 2.7 per cent in Table 3.1; with 
this small sample size, we will need to see large differences across the groups in 
order for any differences to be statistically significant. As will be seen, we 
typically do not see such large differences. 
 
To the extent that trading down is occurring, we should see the distribution of 
house types being skewed towards smaller dwellings in the post-move column. 
Looking at Table 3.7a, we do not generally see this. There are a larger proportion 
of the movers in apartments/flats and bedsits post-move, but the proportion in 
terraced houses falls and the proportion in semi-detached houses rises. Broadly, 
these patterns are present whether people are aged under 70 (Table 3.7b) or 
over 70 (Table 3.7c).12 
 
 
                                                          
11  We also examined whether the deterioration in an older person’s health status between 2009/2011 and 2012 had an 
impact on their likelihood of moving. The results from this analysis, which are available from the authors on request, 
indicated that this health measure also had no impact on an older person’s decision to move accommodation.  
12  For sample size reasons, it is not feasible to examine more disaggregated age groups.  
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TABLE 3.7A House Type of All Private Movers Pre- and Post-Moving 
 Pre-Move Post-Move 
House Type:   
Detached 32.6 31.5 
Semi-Detached 17.0 20.8 
Terraced House 20.8 16.0 
Apartment/Flat/Bedsit 8.4 13.6 
Unknown/Other 21.2 18.2 
Population: 26,935 26,935 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
 
TABLE 3.7B  House Type of Private Movers Aged Less than 70 Pre- and Post-Moving  
 Pre-Move Post-Move 
House Type:   
Detached 29.3 27.1 
Semi-Detached 18.1 22.8 
Terraced House 17.6 13.3 
Apartment/Flat/Bedsit 9.7 14.4 
Unknown/Other 25.2 22.5 
Population: 20,080 20,080 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
Note:  Individuals defined as aged 70 and above on the basis of their age in Wave 1 of the TILDA data 
 
 
TABLE 3.7C House Type of Private Movers Aged 70 and Above Pre- and Post-Moving  
 Pre-Move Post-Move 
House Type:   
Detached 42.3 44.3 
Semi-Detached 13.5 15.0 
Terraced House 30.1 23.9 
Apartment/Flat/Bedsit 4.6 11.2 
Unknown/Other 9.5 5.6 
 6,855 6,855 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
Note:  Individuals defined as aged 70 and above on the basis of their age in Wave 1 of the TILDA data 
 
The issue of size of house pre- and post-move is also considered in Table 3.8 
where we look at the number of rooms in the dwellings. Focusing on dwellings 
with four rooms or less, 26.5 per cent of people live in such houses before their 
move and this rises to 34.2 per cent post-move. While this might provide some 
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evidence of trading down, the difference pre- and post-move is eliminated if we 
look at dwellings with five rooms or less, so any evidence of trading down is 
weak. 
 
TABLE 3.8 Number of Rooms in House of Private Movers Pre- and Post-Moving 
Number of Rooms: Pre-Move Post-Move 
1 1.8 - 
2 3.4 7.9 
3 9.2 13.0 
4 12.1 13.3 
5 24.2 16.4 
6 13.4 16.2 
7 8.5 9.6 
8 4.2 2.3 
9 1.9 1.6 
10 0.6 0.7 
11 0.7  
12 - 0.5 
Unknown 19.9 18.8 
 26,935 26,935 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
 
In Table 3.9, we consider the trading out question by looking at the distribution of 
dwelling by urban and rural locations pre- and post-move. As can be seen, there 
is very little difference in the location distributions and certainly no evidence of 
people moving out of Dublin or other urban areas into rural areas.  
 
TABLE 3.9 Geographic Location of Private Movers Pre- and Post-Moving 
 Pre-Move Post-Move 
Location:   
Dublin city or county 23.9 26.5 
Another town or city 36.0 37.6 
A rural area 39.5 35.9 
Unknown 0.6 - 
 26,935 26,935 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
 
Before leaving this exploration of movers, we can look at a number of further 
questions. In Table 3.10 we look at household composition pre- and post-move to 
see if there is any evidence of people living alone moving in with children or other 
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relatives. As can be seen, there is very little change in the distribution of 
household composition and so little evidence of the living alone moving in with 
others. This is also seen in Table 3.11 where we focus on movers who were living 
alone in 2009/2011. Almost 90 per cent were still living alone post-move. 
 
TABLE 3.10 Household Composition of Private Movers Pre- and Post-Moving 
 Pre-Move Post-Move 
Household Composition:   
Living alone 37.2 35.7 
Living with spouse only 28.1 27.6 
Child/step/adopted/grandchildren 28.8 30.8 
Living with other relative 3.2 3.2 
Living with unrelated people 2.7 2.7 
 26,935 26,935 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
 
TABLE 3.11  Household Composition of People Living Alone in 2010 After Moving (Private Movers Only) 
 Post-Move 
Household Composition:  
Living alone 88.2 
Living with spouse only 9.4 
Child/step/adopted/grandchildren 2.4 
 10,014 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
 
Another issue that we will consider relates to financial transfers. One theme that 
emerged from early analyses of the TILDA data was the significant numbers and 
amounts of financial transfers which older people made to their children – both 
large one-off gifts and ongoing smaller gifts. It is possible that the sale of a house 
leads to the release of equity whereby movers are better positioned to make gifts 
and hence more likely to do so. This could include situations where a move would 
happen regardless of any gift, but where a gift results from the move or a 
situation in which the move is motivated in the first place by the desire to make a 
transfer. In Table 3.12, it can be seen that no evidence emerges for gift-giving 
related to moves.  
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TABLE 3.12 Financial Transfer Information for Non-Movers and Movers 
 Non-Movers All Movers Private HH  Movers 
1.  Gave Property, Large sum of Money 
or Large Gift to Child 
   
Yes 24.1 15.6 16.8 
No 75.9 84.4 83.2 
Total: 100 100 100 
    
Population: 594,855 19,249 16,907 
    
2.  Gave other Financial Transfer to Child    
Yes 49.2 47.0 51.4 
No 50.8 53.0 48.6 
Total: 100 100 100 
    
Population: 594,718 19,483 17,140 
 
Source:  TILDA Waves 1 and 2 Data. 
Notes:  This question is asked only of family, and family/financial respondents. 
 The two population totals differ due to missing information for some individuals for each of the financial transfer type 
questions. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The goals of this paper were twofold. First, we wanted to assess whether there 
was evidence of significant under-utilisation of housing among Ireland’s older 
people in the sense of older people living alone in large houses. Second, we 
wanted to see if there was evidence of trading down or trading out among 
Ireland’s older people. 
 
One-third of the over 50s live alone and almost two-thirds of the over 80s. Many 
of these people live in smaller dwellings and so the evidence on under-utilisation 
is weak if we focus on those living alone. Specifically, 40.6 per cent of older 
people living alone live in houses with four rooms or less: the corresponding 
figure for people living with children/grandchildren is 15.8 per cent. However, 
when we broaden the analysis to include couples, the evidence on under-
utilisation strengthens somewhat. For example, just over 30 per cent of older 
couples live in houses with seven rooms or more. This is smaller than the 
corresponding proportion of families in the sample who live in houses with seven 
or more rooms (36.4 per cent), but still represents a sizeable number. 
 
One implication of the results is that arguments around the potential to generate 
greater movement in the housing market through incentivising older people to 
move might have less impact than is generally understood, based on the findings 
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with respect to those living alone. However, the results for couples suggest that 
there is scope for impact. The low rate of trading down and trading out also 
suggest that there might be scope for freeing up supply of larger houses and in 
urban areas. Given the period over which we observed moves (2009/2011 to 
2012), it is likely that the rate of movement which we observed was lower than 
that which would apply in more normal economic circumstances. For this reason, 
there will be value in returning to this type of analysis as future waves of TILDA 
come on stream.   
 
As a final point, it should be noted that any economic benefit which might accrue 
from the mobility of older people should be set against possible costs in terms of 
social connectedness and health. A growing literature in health sciences is 
creating an increased awareness of the importance of social connectedness in 
later life and the dangers of social isolation (for example, Cornwell and Waite, 
2009). If mobility of older people meant movement out of familiar communities, 
this could be damaging and any policies in this area should be cognisant of this 
issue. 
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Appendix 1 
 
TABLE A.1: Household Type of Individuals Aged 50 and Above Living in Dublin by Household Structure 
 Overall Living 
Alone 
Living with 
Spouse 
Living with children/ 
grandchildren 
Living with 
others1 
Type of Residence:      
Detached House 13.7 10.1 16.8 13.4 20.1 
Semi-Detached House 46.0 39.5 47.9 50.5 34.5 
Terraced House 33.8 34.5 31.7 34.4 41.5 
Apartment/Flat/Bedsit 6.5 15.9 3.4 1.8 3.9 
Other 0.0 - 0.1 - - 
 
Source:  TILDA Wave 1 Data. 
Note:  1 Relative or non-relative. 
 
TABLE A.2: Household Type of Individuals Aged 50 and Above Living in Urban Location by Household 
Structure 
 Overall Living 
Alone 
Living with 
Spouse 
Living with children/ 
grandchildren 
Living with 
others1 
Type of Residence:      
Detached House 35.1 25.8 42.7 37.4 38.7 
Semi-Detached House 33.4 30.1 34.7 36.1 28.1 
Terraced House 27.9 35.6 21.0 26.1 27.5 
Apartment/Flat/Bedsit 3.4 7.8 1.5 0.4 5.8 
Other 0.3 0.8 - - - 
 
Source:  TILDA Wave 1 Data. 
Note:  1 Relative or non-relative. 
 
TABLE A.3: Household Type of Individuals Aged 50 and Above Living in Rural Location by Household 
Structure 
 Overall Living 
Alone 
Living with 
Spouse 
Living with children/ 
grandchildren 
Living with 
others1 
Type of Residence:      
Detached House 87.1 80.9 89.6 89.8 90.3 
Semi-Detached House 7.6 10.8 6.5 6.1 6.2 
Terraced House 4.5 6.2 3.6 3.9 3.6 
Apartment/Flat/Bedsit 0.5 1.6 0.4 0.2 - 
Other 0.4 0.6 - - - 
 
Source:  TILDA Wave 1 Data. 
Note:  1 Relative or non-relative. 
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Housing Supply and House Price Trends: a 
County Level Analysis 
*Edgar Morgenroth1 
1. Introduction 
Developments in the housing market and in particular the availability and 
affordability of both owner-occupied and rented housing have been a topic of 
significant discussion over the recent past.2 Purchase prices for housing nationally 
have increased by 35 per cent since early 2013,3 while rental prices have 
increased by almost 20 per cent since early 2012,4 impacting on the affordability 
of housing. While higher prices affect all households, they have the biggest 
proportionate impact on those with lower incomes. Although not a complete 
measure of housing need, the waiting lists for social housing maintained by local 
authorities indicate a significant increase in the number of households unable to 
secure accommodation in the market.  
 
These trends are a function of the demographic demand for housing, the supply 
of housing, and incomes. Previous research has shown that the number of 
households nationally is likely to increase by 20,000 each year over the next 15 
years, and that this, when combined with the need to replace obsolete dwellings, 
would require an additional 25,000 dwellings per year (Duffy et al., 2014). 
Accounting for an overhang of vacant stock reduces these numbers slightly. 
Moreover, in high demand areas such as Dublin, there was little available vacant 
stock (see Morgenroth, 2014a,b).  
 
The number of completed dwellings has been averaging just over 2,500 units per 
quarter since 2013,5 which implies that increases to the housing stock are less 
than half of what is required. Thus, with underlying demographic demand 
significantly exceeding supply it is not surprising to find both purchase and rental 
 
                                                          
1  This paper was prepared as part of a research programme funded jointly by the National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA) and the Banking and Payments Federation Ireland (BPFI). 
2  E.g. How do we fix the housing crisis? The Irish Times, 9/10/2015 or ‘There's no bubble, but housing crisis will take 
time to fix’. Irish Independent 31/1/2016. 
3  Based on data from the CSO Residential Property Price Index. 
4  Based on data from the PRTB Rental Index. 
5  Based on data from the Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government, Housing Statistics. 
* edgar.morgenroth@esri.ie ESRI Research Notes 2016/1/1 
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prices increasing. A long-term solution to this problem requires significantly 
increased supply of additional housing. 
 
The need for additional dwellings is not evenly spread around the country. 
Morgenroth (2014a,b) estimated that 60 per cent of the required additional 
housing would be needed in Dublin, with the bulk of the remaining need being 
concentrated in the Dublin commuter belt including Kildare, Louth, Meath, 
Wicklow, and the other larger cities (particularly Cork and Galway). Thus, current 
levels of housing completions nationally would barely meet the need for 
additional housing in Dublin.  
 
These regional differences suggest that an analysis of housing supply at the 
county level is more meaningful than an analysis at the national level, as this 
would not identify housing pressures in specific areas. This note provides an 
analysis of housing supply and prices at the county level. It focuses on the more 
recent period, but some analysis is also carried out over a longer period. Also, 
given the identified housing pressures in Greater Dublin, Cork and Galway, trends 
in these areas are considered specifically. 
 
As housing completions arise at the end of a process encompassing planning 
permissions and construction commencements, data on these key stages of the 
construction cycle are also considered here. Furthermore, given the slow 
response of housing supply to the substantial increases in prices, this relationship 
is analysed. Data for the supply cycle variables, planning permissions, 
commencements and completions are taken from the CSO database on planning 
permissions and the Department of the Environment, Community and Local 
Government, Housing Statistics. These provide data for individual local 
authorities. Unfortunately, neither the CSO nor the Department of the 
Environment, Community and Local Government publish house price data at the 
local authority level. A consistent series of county level house prices was 
constructed using both the ESRI/PTSB House Price Index and the quarterly 
reports on asking prices from the online sales and letting portal Daft.ie. While the 
ESRI/PTSB data relate to the average actual prices, the Daft.ie data are for asking 
prices for three-bedroom semi-detached houses.6 
 
 
                                                          
6  The correlation between the Daft.ie asking prices for Dublin and the residential property prices for Dublin published 
by the CSO is very high (between 0.89 and 0.99 depending on the part of the city), and the asking price of three-
bedroom semi-detached houses is highly correlated with both that of one-bedroom apartments (correlation 
coefficient of 0.95 for North Dublin) and larger five-bedroom detached properties (correlation coefficient 0.91 in 
North Dublin).  
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The note is organised as follows. Recent house price trends are considered in 
Section 2, supply trends are outlined in Section 3 and Section 4 considers some 
evidence on the causal relationship between prices and supply. Section 5 offers 
some conclusions 
 
2. House Prices 
House prices nationally have been increasing since early 2013. Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of house prices for the Dublin counties (i.e. Dublin City, Dun Laoghaire-
Rathdown, Fingal and South Dublin), Cork City, Galway City, the Dublin Commuter 
Counties Kildare, Louth, Meath and Wicklow and the remainder of the country. 
The Figure clearly shows both the higher level of prices in the Dublin counties 
compared to the Rest of the Country. It also shows the more rapid growth over 
the period in the city areas and to a slightly lesser degree the Dublin Commuter 
Counties. Between the first quarter of 2013 and the last quarter of 2015 prices 
increased by more than 50 per cent in South Dublin, more than 40 per cent in 
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown and more than 30 per cent in Dublin City, Cork City, 
Galway City and Dublin Commuter Counties. Fingal recorded lower price growth 
at just over 20 per cent while the mean price growth across other counties (Rest 
of the Country) was less than 10 per cent. Interestingly, the Greater Dublin region 
experienced steadily growing prices from early in 2013 but this trend stalled in 
the Dublin counties during the course of 2015. In Cork City and Galway City most 
of the increase in prices occurred during 2015, but this also slowed in the second 
half of 2015. There is less evidence of slowing price increases in Dublin Commuter 
Counties where, however, prices are lower than in the city areas. One 
explanation for this levelling off in prices might be the introduction of maximum 
loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios by the Central Bank. This may put 
upward pressure on prices in surrounding counties where prices are such that 
loan-to-income ratios may not be a binding constraint for purchasers. This would 
give rise to a ripple effect that has been identified in previous research on 
housing markets in other countries (e.g. Meen, 1999; Ma and Chunlu, 2013; Tsai, 
2014).  
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FIGURE 1  House Prices, Quarter 1, 2013 to Quarter 4, 2015 
 
 
Source: The data are from Daft.ie. and refer to three-bedroom semi-detached houses. The figures for Dublin Commuter Counties and 
Rest of the Country are constructed as a simple mean of the respective counties. 
 
Figure 2 shows that price levels across the country are diverging. The degree of 
house price dispersion across all counties can be measured by the standard 
deviation. Figure 2 shows this measure calculated across 32 local authorities over 
the period 1996 to 2015. This shows that the difference between the counties 
with the highest and lowest prices increased over the boom period, decreased 
sharply during the recession, and has increased significantly since 2011. The level 
of house price dispersion across counties is now as large as during the height of 
the housing boom. 
 
During the housing boom this pattern resulted in many households choosing to 
purchase property outside of Dublin, which led to significant long-distance 
commuting. The combination of maximum loan-to-value and loan-to-income 
ratios and diverging house prices between the city areas and the Rest of the 
Country might result in similar purchasing patterns as during the boom period 
with increasing commuting distances and resulting unsustainable transport 
patterns. 
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FIGURE 2 Standard Deviation of House Prices across Counties, 1996 to 2015 
 
 
Source: Own calculations using data from the ESRI/PTSB House Price Index and Daft.ie. 
  
3. Housing Supply 
Increasing prices are a result of demand exceeding supply of housing, which may 
be due to underlying fundamentals such as population growth or speculation. 
Housing completions are shown in Figure 3. The most striking feature of the 
graph is that completions in the Rest of the Country account for about 60 per 
cent of total completions. Total completions in Dublin have averaged just over 
600 per quarter or less than 2,500 per year which is considerably less than the 
number needed to accommodate projected demographic change, which thus 
leads to an increasing undersupply in Dublin. The graph shows that completions 
have been increasing, but that this is concentrated in the Rest of the Country and 
Dublin Commuter Counties, and in the case of the city areas the increases are 
from an exceptionally low base. The number of completions has not been 
increasing in Cork City.  
 
At the national level, quarterly housing completions peaked in the fourth quarter 
of 2006 when over 26,000 units were recorded as being completed. More 
recently (between Q1, 2013 and Q4, 2015) the number of quarterly completions 
was less than a tenth of that observed at the peak. Overall, completions over the 
recent period are only about 28 per cent of the long-run average (average from 
1996 to 2015). At the county level, recent completions in Galway City only 
account for 12 per cent of the long-run average completions for that local 
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authority, while that proportion was 19 per cent for Dublin City and 21 per cent 
for Cork City. In contrast Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown (63 per cent), Fingal (35 per 
cent), Kildare (35 per cent), Louth (32 per cent) and Wicklow (30 per cent) have 
been recording levels of completion a little closer to their long-run averages. This 
suggests specific constraints to increased supply in city areas, which may 
encompass lack of development sites and/or higher development costs. 
 
FIGURE 3  Housing Completions (No. Of Units), Quarter 1, 2013 to Quarter 3, 2015 
 
 
Source: Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government Housing Statistics. 
 
It is also possible to consider the type of properties that were completed using 
annual data. Figure 4 shows the proportion of the total number of completions 
accounted for by one-off houses. The graphs show that this proportion increased 
significantly in the wake of the economic crisis, reaching over 20 per cent in all 
Dublin counties and over 30 per cent in the other cities. In contrast the number of 
completed units accounted for by apartments or flats declined significantly. In the 
case of Dublin City this proportion declined from almost 80 per cent to less than 
40 per cent. This indicates the decline of larger scale developments during the 
downturn. Up to now there is only limited evidence of an increase in apartment 
building, and the decrease in the proportion of completions accounted for by 
one-off houses is largely due to the construction of houses as part of a wider 
scheme. 
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FIGURE 4  Share of Annual Completions Accounted for by One-Off Houses, 2005 to 2015 
 
 
Source: Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government Housing Statistics. 
 
On average, completions account for about 84 per cent of the average number of 
planning permissions over the period 2001 to 2015. Thus, some 16 per cent of 
planning permissions are not converted into completions. Nevertheless, the data 
suggest that planning permissions are a useful indicator of future housing 
completions even though not all permissions will result in completions. 
 
The peak number of units for which planning permission was granted during the 
boom was just under 29,000 units in the second quarter of 2005. Since then the 
number of units for which planning permission has been granted has declined 
significantly, averaging just over 2,000 units during the period 2013 to the third 
quarter of 2015, which represents just over 7 per cent of the peak level. This 
trend is also reflected in the Dublin counties and the other cities (see Figure 5). 
However, planning permissions declined more than the national average in 
Dublin City and Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown. More recently there are signs that the 
number of planning permissions is increasing nationally. In contrast in Cork City 
and Galway City planning permissions remain flat.  
 
In relation to the composition of planning permissions, there is a slight downward 
trend in the proportion accounted for by one-off houses suggesting a gradual 
return of larger scale developments. The percentage of permissions (units) 
accounted for by one-off houses had increased in all Dublin counties and cities in 
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the wake of the economic crisis, reaching as high as 100 per cent in South Dublin 
in the first quarter of 2012. The data show that the increase in the share of 
planning permissions accounted for by one-off houses was due to the decline in 
multi-development houses and apartments which came to a virtual standstill. 
Planning permissions for apartments and flats hit a low of 114 in the second 
quarter of 2014 while planning permissions for multi-development houses were 
at their lowest in the first quarter of 2012. More recently the proportion 
accounted for by one-off houses has been at just over 10 per cent in Dublin City, 
less than 10 per cent in Fingal and South Dublin, but well above 10 per cent in 
Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown.  
 
However, the low number of new planning permissions for apartments/flats over 
the recent period also indicates that supply of these types of units will not 
increase rapidly. In Fingal the average number of planning permissions granted 
for apartments or flats in the period 2013 to the third quarter of 2015 is less than 
a fifth of the average number over the period 2001 to the third quarter of 2015, 
and less in other counties. 
 
FIGURE 5  Planning Permissions Granted (No. Of Units), Quarter 1, 2013 to Quarter 3, 2015 
 
 
Source: Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government Housing Statistics. 
 
The final supply variable considered here is the number of construction 
commencements. These peaked in the second quarter of 2006 while completions 
peaked two quarters later. Over the more recent period since the start of 2013 
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commencements averaged at just over 7 per cent of the peak level. As for 
completions there is some evidence that commencements are increasing but that 
the total number remains very small, and they also appear to have dipped over 
the most recent quarters. Figure 6 shows the number of commencements for the 
four Dublin counties and the other cities. The Figure shows the low level of 
commencements in all counties as well as the spike due to the methodological 
change for the data collection.7 The graph shows that commencements have 
increased recently in Dublin City and Fingal, while there is no evidence of an 
increase in the number of units on which construction has commenced in other 
counties and cities. Thus, one can expect an increase in the supply of housing in 
Dublin City and Fingal as the units which have been commenced will be 
completed. 
 
FIGURE 6  Construction Commencements (No. Of Units), Quarter 1, 2013 to Quarter 4, 2015 
 
 
Source: Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government Housing Statistics. 
 
4. Relationship Between Prices and Supply 
A strong increase in prices is a clear sign that demand exceeds supply. However, 
increasing prices should also result in increased supply. While the analysis above 
suggests that there is some evidence of supply picking up, this descriptive 
 
                                                          
7  The data are now collected using the Building Control Management System (BCMS), whereas the data were 
previously collected from the Residential Commencement Notices received by Local Authorities. The data up to 
March 2014 recorded the commencement when the notice was received while the data for the subsequent period 
recorded the date of commencement as the date reported by the developer/builder. 
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approach cannot determine the causal temporal relationship between the 
variables.  
 
One simple way to consider the relationship between prices and supply is to 
calculate the correlation coefficient between price and completions. Over the 
period 1996 to the third quarter of 2015 the correlation between prices and 
completions was 0.62 at the national level. At the county level there are some 
differences with the correlation ranging from 0.76 down to 0.06, and there are 
also differences across time periods. The positive correlation coefficient might 
suggest a positive response of completions to an increase in prices. However, the 
significant drawback of a simple correlation coefficient is that it cannot identify 
the direction of causality i.e. a positive correlation between prices and 
completions might be due to a price response to change in completions rather 
than a response of completions as a result of increases in prices. 
 
A widely used approach to analyse the inter-temporal relationships between 
variables is to utilise so called vector autoregressions (VAR), where each variable 
is modelled as a function of current and lagged values of all variables of interest.8 
This approach can be used to determine whether variables change in response to 
each other. It thus overcomes the shortcoming of the correlation coefficient in 
that it is able to identify the direction of causality. Formally, if a variable helps in 
predicting the other it is said to Granger-cause the other variable. 
 
Applying this methodology yields some interesting results.9 When analysed 
across all counties there is strong evidence that an increase in prices causes an 
increase in completions i.e. there is a supply response. This finding holds for 
estimates calculated over the 1996 to 2015 period and also the sub-periods 1996 
to 2006 and 2007 to 2015. However, different results are found for county sub-
groups. Specifically the results for Dublin and Dublin Commuter Counties indicate 
that particularly in the 2007 to 2015 period, completions do not respond to price 
changes.10  
 
This is an important but counterintuitive result, which suggests that other 
constraints are preventing supply from increasing. Price increases may not have 
been sufficient to make developments in Dublin profitable, perhaps because of 
 
                                                          
8  VARs gained their popularity following the work by Sims (1980). 
9  This section draws on results from the forthcoming working paper Morgenroth, E., (2016) ‘From Planning to 
Completion: A County Level Analysis of Housing Supply’. 
10  In the case of the four Dublin counties and the four Dublin Commuter Counties the effect of prices on completions is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels both when estimated using the price level and the change in prices. 
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higher construction costs,11 or because of planning regulations that add to costs. 
Developers may still find it difficult to raise credit for larger projects and indeed 
many may not be in a position to re-enter the market. Results from VAR models, 
where permissions and commencements are included in addition to prices and 
completions, show that the number of planning permissions responds positively 
to increases in the number of completions. This suggests that new developments 
are financed with the proceeds of completed developments and that developers 
are currently reluctant to initiate concurrent developments, which would indicate 
a risk-averse position. Finally, the lack of a supply response due to the increased 
prices may also be due to the expectation of even higher prices in the future, 
which would lead to land hoarding.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This note has shown that while house prices overall have been increasing and 
there has been some evidence of growth in housing supply, the trends vary 
significantly across the country. The dispersion of house prices across Irish 
counties is now as great as it was during the height of the boom. The economy of 
Dublin was less affected by the recession than other regions and has recorded 
growth in key variables. Real per capita gross value added in Dublin was 10 per 
cent higher in 2014 than in 2007, and with respect to other indicators Dublin is 
closer to the peak levels than most other regions. Strong employment growth, a 
reduction of the numbers unemployed and income growth have added to the 
demand for housing in Dublin.12 The price differential coupled with new loan-to-
income limits could force households to seek housing outside of Dublin and to 
commute longer distances, repeating trends during the boom.  
 
A striking result is the lack of a supply response to increases in prices in the 
Greater Dublin region. This raises questions about the constraints that prevent 
normal market responses. The analysis here does not shed any light on the 
causes. A recent review of the international literature on housing supply policies 
highlights that key policies that might reduce housing supply are planning 
regulation, infrastructure costs and inappropriate taxation (Morley et al., 2015).  
 
 
                                                          
11  Construction costs for residential property in the Dublin area are roughly 50 per cent higher than in the North-West 
of the country (Chartered Quantity Surveyors, 2015). 
12  According to the CSO Quarterly National Household Survey, the unemployment rate in Dublin was just 8 per cent in 
Q3, 2015, compared to the national rate of 9.3 per cent. The CSO Live Register statistics also show that the numbers 
signing on in Dublin had reduced by one-quarter since peaking during the recession. CSO County Income Statistics 
also show that Dublin was the only county where total incomes increased in 2011. 
84 | Qua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  Comme nt ary  –  S p r i n g  2 016  
 
Additionally, despite the price rises the Dublin market may still not be profitable 
for developers. There may be a lack of suitable development land available or 
developers might be hoarding land for future development given the likely higher 
price and therefore profit that will be available in the future. Developers might 
also face financing constraints. In this respect it is noteworthy that a causal 
relationship from completions to planning permissions exists, which might 
suggest that the receipts from completed developments are needed to 
commence the planning of new developments.  
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